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ARTICLES

RATIONAL DECISIONMAKING ABOUT MARRIAGE
AND DIVORCE
Elizabeth S. Scott*

THE
apparent normative goal of modem divorce law is the efficient
termination of unsuccessful marriages. Once the couple (or either
party) determine that the marriage is no longer satisfactory, then
quick and easy exit is deemed desirable. As Carl Schneider suggests,
the law has withdrawn from moral discourse about divorce, adopting
a neutral stance toward marital dissolution.' Although divorce typically imposes formidable psychological and economic costs, there are
few legal incentives to remain married, or even to consider thoughtfully the decision to end the marriage. Moreover, although decisions
about marriage and divorce have important legal implications, the law
does nothing to prevent or deter hasty or ill-informed choices by
couples entering marriage.
The current stance of the law is understandable in its historical context. Divorce law of a generation ago conflicted with prevailing social
norms and was frequently evaded or ignored.2 The movement from
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Virginia. This Article has benefited greatly
from the helpful comments of colleagues who read an earlier draft. I would like to thank
Kenneth Abraham, Katharine Bartlett, Lillian BeVier, Robert Cooter, Robert Emery, Mary
Ann Glendon, Kent Greenawalt, John Jeffries, Saul Levmore, John Monahan, Linda
Monahan, Subha Narasimhan, Glen Robinson, Carl Schneider, William Stuntz, Steven
Sugarman, Franklin Zimring, and the participants in faculty workshops at the Columbia Law
School, at the University of Virginia Law School, and at a Law-Psychology Colloquium at
SUNY-Buffalo. I also thank Polly Schaefer and Diane Heller for their able research
assistance. Most of all, I thank Robert Scott, whose unfailing support and helpful suggestions
have been invaluable.
I Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 Mich.
L. Rev. 1803, 1810 (1985). See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of
this trend.
2 For an insightful early analysis of the malfunctioning of the fault-based system and
proposals for reform, see Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 Va. L. Rev.
32 (1966); see also infra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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legal rules based on "fault" to "breakdown" grounds for divorce
reflected a modem conception of marital dissolution. More precisely,
it signaled a changed conception of marriage. Marriage is no longer a
relationship reinforced by religious, moral, and legal restraints.
Indeed, contemporary marriage has been aptly described as a "non-

binding commitment," 3 a relationship that may begin with optimistic
hopes that it will endure, but that survives only as long as each
spouse's needs are met.

This conception of marriage and divorce, although apparently
offering enhanced personal freedom, has seemed unsatisfactory to

many observers. 4 Some perceive the high divorce rate5 as symptomatic of deep societal dysfunction. Social critics have described with
alarm the "culture of narcissism" in our society, characterized by selfgratification and the absence of commitment. Several legal scholars
have suggested that the rhetoric of family law Should emphasize rela3 Schneider, supra note 1, at 1848 (citing N. O'Neill & G. O'Neill, quoted in C. Lasch, The
Culture of Narcissism, infra note 6, at 200).
4 Lawrence Stone questions whether escalating divorce "has done much to advance the
Benthamite objective of the greatest happiness of the greatest number." Stone, The Road to
Polygamy (Book Review), N.Y. Rev. Books, Mar. 2, 1989, at 12, 15. He describes the current
situation as one in which "spouses are being traded in almost as cheaply and easily as used
cars." Id.
5 If the current trend continues, almost 50% of marriages begun in the 1980's will end in
divorce. Glick, How American Families are Changing, 6 Am. Demographics 20, 24 (1984).
In the past few years, the divorce rate has leveled off. Id. at 23-24.
6 C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing
Expectations (1978) [hereinafter C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism]; C. Lasch, The Minimal
Self: Psychic Survival in Troubled Times (1984) [hereinafter C. Lasch, The Minimal Self].
Lasch views modem persons as struggling for psychic survival in response to the unstable
social and economic conditions after the Second World War. The response is a retreat from
long-term commitments because of uncertainty about the future. C. Lasch, The Minimal Self,
at 15-20. Robert Bellah and his colleagues have examined the negative influence of our strong
tradition of individualism on the inclination toward personal and social commitment. In a
study that set out to find what is important to modem Americans by questioning people about
their concerns, Bellah and his colleagues report that many people tend to resort to the "first
language" of individualism. R. Bellah, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidler & E. Stipton,
Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life 20-21 (1985)
[hereinafter R. Bellah]. This language is, in Bellah's terms, expressive and utilitarian; it serves
poorly as a medium for talking about societal problems because it focuses on personal and
immediate concerns. Id. The tension between individualism and commitment is clearly
reflected in the modem ideology of marriage and divorce. To the extent that love and
marriage are seen in terms of psychological gratification, as Bellah finds they increasingly are,
they may less effectively serve their "older social function of providing people with stable,
committed relationships that tie them into the larger society." Id. at 85.
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tionship and responsibility and speak less in the language of individual rights.7
Of particular concern are the most vulnerable casualties of the
modem marriage, the minor children of divorce.8 Children typically
bear substantial psychological and economic costs for a decision in
which they have no role. The easy availability of divorce today surely
contributes to the magnitude of its harmful effect on children.9 In a
legal culture committed to protecting the welfare of children, this
realization is disquieting. It suggests, at least, that some reflection on
these matters is in order. This would be so even if the interests of
adults were well served by the current freedom-maximizing policy, a
conclusion that is far from certain.
Although dissatisfaction with contemporary marriage has generated nostalgia about "family values," few suggest that we respond by
resurrecting the traditional legal regime. Instead, we might look to
the nature of the current disquiet about popular marital norms for
clues about a legal regime toward which we might aspire. The conventional "story" of modem marriage is one of limited investment
and individual pursuit of self-gratification, followed by. disappointment and the breakdown of the relationship. If this story suppresses
important individual and societal values and goals, then it may be

7 This has been an important theme of feminist legal scholars. A recent thoughtful
exposition is offered by Katharine Bartlett, who argues that the law should express a view of
parenthood emphasizing relationship and responsibility rather than exchange and rights in
responding to certain custody disputes. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 Yale L.J. 293
(1988). Other scholars who have focused on the destructive effects on the family of the legal
emphasis on individual ights include Mary Ann Glendon. M. Glendon, Abortion and
Divorce in Western Law (1987) (examining how the deeply entrenched language of individual
rights in this country has shaped the "story" the law tells of divorce and pointing out that ours
is virtually the only Western country in which married persons have a "right" to divorce); see
also Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing
the Individual and Social Interests, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 463 (1983) (challenging individual rights
analysis as sacrificing an important social interest in the family); Minow, "Forming
Underneath Everything that Grows:" Toward a History of Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. Rev. 819
(focusing on the social experience within the family rather than on the law as written);
Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 Calif. L. Rev. 151 (1988)
(discussing the flaws inherent in an individual rights analysis of neonatal euthanasia).
s In 1976, for example, 57% of divorces involved minor children. Divorce, Child Custody,
and Child Support, in Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dept. Commerce Current Population
Reports, Special Studies 8 (Series P-23, No. 84, 1979).
9 See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
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important to ask what alternative conception we would prefer. Only
then can we explore whether the law could better mirror our goals.
There is an alternative story1" that better comports with the aspirations of many people for their own marriages. 1 Two people enter
marriage committed to its success and endurance, though not, as in
the past, because of religious obligation or moral duty to the spouse.
Rather, each person determines that individual self-fulfillment will be
promoted by a substantial investment in a stable, interdependent,
long-term relationship with a marital partner. The couple also view
having and raising children together in a loving home as important to
self-realization. Here, they are also motivated by a sense of responsibility to their offspring to provide the best possible environment for
their children's development. The couple realize that over time,
stresses may threaten the stability of their relationship, but they hope
and expect that the relationship will last. If the marriage should
prove unfulfilling despite the couple's best efforts, they would divorce
only after long and careful consideration, doing everything possible to
reduce the costs to their children.
The law currently does not express the values reflected in the story
of enduring marriage. This disjunction may represent a significant
lost opportunity. At least at some intangible level, the law itself, in
the way it portrays marriage and in its reinforcement of social norms,
influences what people perceive the marital relationship to be. A legal
regime that reflects the values of commitment could further several
important social interests, ranging from the concrete (reduction of
divorce litigation) to the intangible (enhancement of personal happiness). Most important, a legal regime that reinforces a cultural con10 Several legal scholars in recent years have argued that an important function of law is its
role of telling stories about our culture; in so doing, the legal rhetoric interprets the culture to

itself and also affects change. The leading proponent of this perspective is James Boyd White.
See White, Law As Rhetoric, Rhetoric As Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal Life, 52
U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1985) (Law is a branch of rhetoric, "the central art by which community
and culture are established, maintained, and transformed."). Mary Ann Glendon has adopted

this metaphor in examining and comparing abortion and divorce law in different countries. M.
Glendon, supra note 7, at 8-9. Glendon suggests that the story of family law in this country is
shaped by the deeply rooted language of individualism. Id. at 112-14. The legal vocabulary of
individual rights defines and restricts the story of divorce told by the law. As Glendon
suggests, this vocabulary "ha[s] been inadequate to the task of telling the kind of story most
Americans would want to tell about.., divorce .... " Id. at 113.

11 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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ception of marriage as an enduring and stable relationship may
enhance the welfare of children.
This Article applies precommitment theory to the marriage relationship in order to explore whether social norms supporting lasting
marriage should be legally reinforced. Precommitment strategies are
useful when an individual seeks to pursue a declared long-term preference, but fears that she may make future choices based on short-term
prefe;ences that are inconsistent with this goal. The problem of
inconsistent choices can be mitigated by various ex ante devices
designed either to preclude the undesirable choice or to increase its
costliness. A precommitment analysis suggests that the discredited
fault-based divorce law, despite other inadequacies, may have served a
beneficial function by imposing costs on divorce. An alternative legal
regime offering precommitment options that are more compatible
with contemporary social norms may promote marital stability and
thereby benefit spouses and children.
Precommitment analysis also clarifies the importance of thoughtful
decisionmaking about marriage and divorce as a means of reducing
the risk of marital failure. Research in decision theory suggests that
cognitive biases, haste, and poor information may cause decisionmaking error. The current law of marriage and divorce does little to
reduce the potential for such error. Legal regulation can provide a
context for decisions that would more accurately reflect long-term
interests.
In Part I of the Article, I trace the evolution of divorce law from
the fault-based regime of the past to the normatively neutral modern
law. I question the assumption that current divorce law accurately
reflects the modern social norm of self-realization. A recognition that
self-fulfillment may have replaced religious and moral duty as a primary behavioral objective does not necessarily mandate replacing the
barriers of fault divorce rules with "quick and easy" divorce. As I
have suggested, policies supporting investment in and commitment to
marriage may also reflect contemporary attitudes and values. Further, policies promoting marital stability may better protect the welfare of children, an outcome that also reflects commonly shared goals.
Drawing on social science research on divorce, I also challenge the
assumption, implicit in modern divorce law, that if either parent is
dissatisfied with the marriage, then divorce must be better for
children.
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Part II introduces precommitment theory and explores its application to decisions about marriage and divorce. Using theoretical models of divorce decisionmaking grounded in social psychology, I
examine the potential impact of precommitment strategies on that
decision and conclude that some couples may reduce the risk of marital failure by using precommitment mechanisms. Moreover, these
strategies may promote cooperative behavior during marriage and
encourage more thoughtful decisions about entering marriage. In this
Part, I also consider the potential for cognitive error in marriage and
divorce decisions. This potential suggests a beneficial role for a corrective legal response, but it also points to limits on the usefulness of
precommitment theory in this context. Nevertheless, I conclude that
precommitment mechanisms may help some couples to realize their
goals of lasting marriage. More generally, precommitment theory
offers both the basis and the means to shape an ideology of marriage
and family that reflects important societal values obscured under current law.
Part III explores how precommitment theory might influence legal
policy regulating divorce. I argue that a precommitment rationale
supports legally imposed burdens on divorce decisions by parents of
minor children. Such restrictions reinforce the hopes of most parents
for enduring family relationships and signal the societal value of family stability. However, modem norms do not support paternalistic
restrictions on those divorces in which only the interests of two adults
are at stake. Here, I argue that the legal enforcement of antenuptial
precommitment contracts offers couples maximum freedom to pursue
their goals for marriage. Thus, I conclude that different legal regimes
for regulating divorces involving minor children and other divorces
may be desirable.
I.

MODERN MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE: CHALLENGING THE
"EFFICIENCY" NORM

A. Divorce Law: From Fault to Moral Neutrality
1. The Failure of TraditionalDivorce Law
American law has never raised substantial obstacles to entering
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marriage.12 Even when marriage was presumed to be a life-long commitment and divorce was rare, the law did little to promote thoughtfulness in decisions to marry. This function may have been served
historically by religious and cultural traditions, such as betrothal periods and posting of banns.

In contrast, divorce-was historically restricted by the law and was
unavailable other than in extreme circumstances. Divorce law was
largely a nineteenth-century development, and divorces were not
common until the twentieth century. 13 Until the 1960's, most states
allowed divorce only upon the proof by one party that the other had
14
committed a serious offense against the marriage.
As the social climate in this country became more hospitable to

divorce in the postwar era, fault-based divorce law became less effective as a barrier to exit from marriage. The reform movement was
supported in part by the argument that restrictive laws were often
subverted and ignored.15 Two common evasions were migratory
divorce (the practice of "moving" to a jurisdiction whose laws were
hospitable to divorce)' 6 and collusion between the parties, resulting in
12In most states, couples must file for a marriage license and demonstrate evidence of
having met medical requirements (primarily tests for venereal diseases). Waiting periods
before or after issuance of the license vary from no waiting period to five days. See the list of
state marriage laws in 23 Council of State Gov'ts, Book of the States 46 (1980-81).
13In 1867, the first year for which statistics are available, the annual divorce rate was 0.3
divorces per 1000 population; in 1979 this figure was 5.3 per 1000 population. Glick & Lin,
Recent Changes in Divorce and Remarriage, 48 J. Marriage & Fam. 737, 737-38 (1986).
14Fault grounds were numerous and varied among the states. The most typical grounds
were adultery, desertion, physical and mental cruelty, long imprisonment for a felony, habitual
intoxication, or drug addiction. Many modem state laws retain fault grounds along with
breakdown grounds. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 19-5-3 (1982) (fault grounds including
drunkenness, cruelty, desertion, and adultery).
15 See Wadlington, supra note 2, at 33-35. Walker describes the response of couples or
persons seeking to end marriage in the face of strict traditional divorce laws as "law
avoidance." Walker, Beyond Fault: An Examination of Patterns of Behavior in Response to
Present Divorce Laws, 10 J. Fam. L. 267, 269-70 (1971).
16What made a state attractive to a person seeking divorce was both lenient divorce law
and a short time period to establish domicile. The popularity of Nevada as a jurisdiction in
which to obtain divorce was based in part on its requirement of only six weeks residence to
establish domicile. In a typical case, the spouse "moved" to Nevada, remained long enough to
establish domicile, obtained a divorce, and then returned to the "home" state, i.e., the state
with more restrictive divorce laws. See Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of
Marriage Stability, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 633, 641-43 (1956). Rheinstein applied Gresham's law to
divorce in arguing that if divorce is difficult to obtain in one place and easy in another, "cases
tend to accumulate in the place of easy, and to dry up in the place of hard divorce." Id. at 641.

16
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perjury to establish fault. 17 Observers in the 1960's reported that
ninety percent of all divorces based on a fault ground were granted
without contest, and that hearings were brief and perfunctory. 8
Thus, the status of being the "innocent party" in a divorce often only

conferred an advantage in negotiating a settlement.19
At least by the 1960's, fault grounds were not a disabling barrier to
marital dissolution. The traditional moral and religious premise of
divorce law-that marriage should last until death unless one party
had grievously misbehaved-seemed no longer to reflect the prevailing social norms. Further, the predicate of fault as the basis for

divorce was inconsistent with modem conceptions of the complexity
of marital breakdown. Under the modem view, the specific behavior

that constituted legal fault was usually only a small part of a story of
shared responsibility for the failure of the marriage.20

17 In New York, which maintained rigorous evidentiary requirements for establishing
adultery as the sole ground for divorce, collusion between the spouses was notorious and
widespread. In one description of the staged evidence of adultery, a judge reported "[s]he is
always in a sheer pink robe ... [a]nd he is always in his shorts when they catch them."
Wadlington, supra note 2, at 33. Divorce "rings" in New York provided trumped-up evidence
of adultery as early as the late 19th century. L. Friedman, A History of American Law 439
(1973). See generally Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 Cornell L.Q. 303 (1950)
(discussing the large volume of uncontested adultery actions that were handled in an assembly
line manner); Note, Collusive and Consensual Divorce and the New York Anomaly, 36
Colum. L. Rev. 1121 (1936) (arguing that the adoption of divorce by mutual consent would
limit the amount of pejury and collusion present in divorce trials).
Is It was reported that the average divorce trial in New York rarely lasted 15 minutes.
Wels, supra note 17, at 318.
19 The fact that there was collusion and often implicit consent did not signify that both
spouses wanted the divorce. Rather, the reluctant spouse likely often used the bargaining
advantage afforded by the fault requirement in the negotiation of a separation agreement. See
Foster & Freed, Divorce Reform: Brakes on Breakdown, 13 J. Fam. L. 443 (1973-74). This
could be a significant advantage if one spouse was eager for release. Lenore Weitzman has
argued that an important effect of no-fault divorce is the loss of this bargaining advantage
(which she assumes generally benefited women). L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 28-31
(1985).
20 In California, the Governor's Commission on the Family, established in 1966,
recommended that fault grounds for divorce be abolished. One important justification of this
stance was the recognition "that a system which inflexibly characterizes one spouse as
'innocent' while thereby stamping the other as 'guilty' simply does not jibe with a realistic
assessment of human behavior.. . ." Report of the Governor's Commission on the Family 30
(1966).

1990]
2.

RationalDecisionmaking

17

The Move to No-Fault Divorce

The early reform movement was led primarily by academics, lawyers, and clerics; curiously, there is little evidence that public dissatisfaction with traditional divorce law was a significant factor.2 The
reforms were characterized primarily as efforts to save the integrity of
the law and the legal process by allowing humane and dignified
divorce to couples who were certain that their marriage was dead. At
the outset, the reform proposals did not contemplate easy or unilateral divorce; mandatory counseling and proof of breakdown were
often recommended.2" The objective was to promote a careful determination that the marriage was indeed not viable.
In the last fifteen years, the law (at least in practice) has moved
increasingly toward a goal of facilitating termination of marriage.

The underlying premise is that if either or both partners determine
that the marriage is no longer satisfactory, then the law should not
raise barriers to ending the relationship. In many states today, 2mar3
riage is functionally a contract terminable at will by either party. If
21 H. Jacob, Silent Revolution: The Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States 9,
83-88, (1988). One of the few commentators in the 1960's and early 1970's who saw a value to
the fault regime despite its malfunctioning was Max Rheinstein. Rheinstein pointed out that
the legal regulation that made divorce difficult reflected the ideals of society as a whole,
whereas the mechanisms for thwarting the law (such as migratory divorce and collusion)
allowed escape for those who could not live up to the ideal. See M. Rheinstein, Marriage
Stability, Divorce, and the Law 51 (1972).
22 In 1968, Brigitte Bodenheimer commented, "Entirely unilateral divorce at the option of
either spouse, without conditions, is seldom advocated today." Bodenheimer, Reflections on
the Future of Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. Fam. L. 179, 193 (1968) (arguing that no one should
be bound to an intolerable marriage, but also against easy divorce); see Group Appointed by
Archbishop of Canterbury, Putting Asunder: A Divorce Law for Contemporary Society 63, 68
(1966) (British divorce law reform commission recommending abolition of fault grounds, to be
replaced by breakdown of the marriage; judicial inquiry into the condition of the marriage and
proof of breakdown recommended); Report of the Governor's Commission on the Family,
supra note 20, at 9-12 (proposing the establishment of a system of family courts staffed by
counselors who would evaluate the couple and promote reconciliation or provide divorce
counseling and determine whether the marriage had truly broken down); Foster & Freed,
supra note 19, at 446; Kay, A Family Court: The California Proposal, 56 Calif. L. Rev. 1205,
1227 (1968) (objective of the counseling proposed by the Commission was to protect the
privacy of the parties, not to serve as curative function for the individual). See generally L.
Halem, Divorce Reform: Changing Legal and Social Perspectives 233-83 (1980) (discussing
the proposal and adoption of no-fault divorce as an escape from an irretrievably broken
marriage without the need to place blame on either party).
23 Only two states, New York and Mississippi, require both spouses' consent to obtain
divorce on breakdown grounds. M. Glendon, supra note 7, at 76. In 40 states, divorce may be
obtained after a separation of one year or less, regardless of the opposition of one spouse. Id.
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either spouse asserts that the marriage has broken down, then the law
facilitates a relatively quick and simple end to the relationship. In
most states, it is possible to extricate oneself from marriage in well
under a year.24
Two examples illustrate the trend toward promoting "efficient"
divorce as a primary normative goal. The first involves the separation
ground for divorce. Even in the era of fault divorce, many states
allowed divorce after a couple had lived separately for an extended
period of time. Separation is a ground for divorce in many states
under no-fault regimes as well. The trend in the last ten or fifteen
years has been to reduce the time period of separation. For example,
in Virginia, in 1962 a couple could obtain a divorce after a three-year
separation; in 1970, the separation period became two years; today the
period is one year or six months if the couple has no minor children.2 5
A more indirect example of the policy of promoting disentanglement of divorced couples is seen in the law regulating property distribution and support. Here, the trend has been toward settling all
financial matters at the time of the divorce and discouraging a continuing financial relationship. Thus, lump-sum property settlements and
short-term rehabilitative alimony are preferred over arrangements
that extend payments over time.26 Long-term alimony is virtually a
thing of the past in many states. Although the sources of this legal
trend are complex, one factor has been the goal of promoting quick,
clean resolution of the relationship and its attendant responsibilities.27
Judges deciding divorce on breakdown grounds are sometimes directed by statute to make an
inquiry into the validity of the breakdown; in practice, this has become a formality. Id. at 78;
see I. Ellman, P. Kurtz & A. Stanton, Family Law 203 (1986) [hereinafter I. Ellman]. Only
Washington explicitly affords either unhappy spouse a unilateral "right to divorce." Wash.
Rev. Code Ann. § 26.09.030 (1986).

24 New York, with the most restrictive divorce law, requires a one-year judicially
recognized separation by written agreement before divorce. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 170(6)
(McKinney 1988). The emphasis on quick divorce was brought home to me recently by a
lawyer's advertisement in a Boston subway car: "Divorce $295-24 hour divorce $595."
25 See Va. Code Ann. § 20-91(9) (1960); Va. Code Ann. § 20-91(9) (Supp. 1970); Va. Code

Ann. § 20-91(9)(a) (Supp. 1989). One reason for this trend toward shorter mandatory waiting
periods was the accommodation of parties whose desire to avoid lengthy delay before divorce
might lead them to opt for an alternative fault ground.
26 Indeed some commentators have argued for lump-sum alimony. See H. Clark, The Law
of Domestic Relations in the United States 653-54 (2d ed. 1988).
27 The preference today is increasingly for short-term rehabilitative alimony to allow the
dependent partner to obtain skills so that she can become financially independent. Some states
limit by statute the duration of alimony. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 13, § 1512(d) (Supp. 1988)
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The modem norm seems to be, as a pessimistic Yogi Berra might have
put it, "once the marriage is over, it's over."2 And it's over when one
partner wants to end it. In sharp contrast to the approach of an earlier era when moral and religious commitments toward marriage were
legally enforced, there seems to be a view today that it would be
unseemly for the law to restrict quick departure from an unhappy
marriage, or even to promote caution in the decision to depart.2 9

This neutrality toward divorce reflects what Carl Schneider has
called the law's withdrawal from moral discourse about the family.3"
In general, the law increasingly has left decisions about the regulation
of marriage and family life to the involved parties. In Schneider's
view, several factors have contributed to this trend. A legal policy of
respect for family autonomy and for individual liberty has traditionally inhibited intervention in the family; this policy has been enhanced
by the development of the constitutional privacy doctrine. 31 Further,

changing moral values in society, as evidenced by the sexual revolution and the decline of religion in American life, have greatly reduced
(alimony limited in most cases to period of 50% of the marriage term). Other states allow
courts to limit the duration of alimony. Cal. Civ. Code § 4801(a), (d) (West Supp. 1989); Unif.
Marriage and Divorce Act § 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 348 (1987). The move to rehabilitative
alimony is based in part on the expectation that divorced men will remarry and have
responsibility for new families. See Turner v. Turner, 158 N.J. Super. 313, 317, 385 A.2d
1280, 1281-82 (1978) ("The law should provide both parties with the opportunity to make a
new life. . . . Neither should be shackled by the unnecessary burdens of an unhappy
marriage."). See generally Note, Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More
Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F. L. Rev. 493 (1978)
(discussing the relevant factors in an award of rehabilitative spousal support and the trend
toward sending the dependent spouse back to work). David Chambers has suggested that the
policy underlying rehabilitative alimony may be extended to child support obligations in the
future. Chambers, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 Mich. L. Rev.
1614 (1982).
28 See R. Lederer, Anguished English 89 (1987) (quoting Y. Berra: "It ain't over 'til it's
over.").

29 Mary Ann Glendon suggests that American divorce law is almost unique among that of
Western nations in coming close to establishing a "right to divorce." Although many
European countries have no-fault divorce law, few allow easy termination of the marriage
unless both parties agree. In the absence of consent and fault, most European countries
require waiting periods of more than a year; in England, the period is five years. In all
European countries except Sweden, courts have discretion to deny divorce. In 18 American
states, courts lack this authority. M. Glendon, supra note 7, at 64-81. Divorce may be (and
occasionally is) denied in France if it would entail "material or moral consequences" to the
unwilling spouse or the children. Id. at 72 (citing French civil code, C. civ. art. 240).
30 Schneider, supra note 1, at 1807-08.
31Id. at 183342.
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consensus about moral norms; this has surely weakened the moralistic

base of family law.32 Perhaps the most important influence on the
law's current stance is what Schneider calls the "Rise of Psychologic
Man."33 He argues convincingly that the behavior of modem persons
is directed more toward self-realization and personal well-being than
toward the fulfillment of moral and religious duty.34 This shift in cultural norms has contributed to a changed conception of marriage.
The language of therapy has become the rhetoric of modem
marriage.35
Changing gender roles have also contributed to this changed conception of marriage. Ideal wives in traditional marriages were
devoted, unselfish caretakers of the home, the family, and the marriage. As the traditional model has eroded, the qualities associated
with masculine values of achievement, self-development, and personal
fulfillment have become dominant for both spouses.36 With this
32 Id. at 1842-45.
33 Id. at 1845.

34 In developing his thesis and in describing "psychologic man," Schneider draws on the
recent literature in psychology and sociology, although he traces the roots of the perspective to
Freud. Id. at 1846-51. A sharply critical analysis of the trend toward self-fulfillment as the
central motivating force of persons in modem society is articulated by Christopher Lasch. See
C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, supra note 6; C. Lasch, The Minimal Self, supra note 6.
Bellah and his colleagues have offered an influential and troubling description of the character
of modem Americans in an examination of the modem expression of the deeply rooted value
of individualism in our society. For a description of Bellah's study, see R. Bellah, supra note 6.
In the arena of love and marriage, modem individualism leads persons to seek relationships
that will meet their needs. Self-sacrifice in relationships, which was once highly valued, has
been replaced by an ideal of self-fulfillment. Swidler, Love and Adulthood in American
Culture, in Individualism and Commitment in American Life: Readings on the Themes of
Habits of the Heart 107, 120-21 (R. Bellah, R. Madsen, W. Sullivan, A. Swidle & S. Tipton
eds. 1987) [hereinafter Individualism & Commitment].
35 Bellah and his colleagues found that many modem Americans describe the ideal love
relationship in therapeutic terms. "[T]he therapeutic attitude denies all forms of obligation
and commitment in relationships, replacing them only with the ideal of full, open, honest
communication among self-actualized individuals." R. Bellah, supra note 6, at 101. Although
lasting relationships may be desirable, they are possible only as long as the needs of both
persons are met. The only obligation of individuals entering relationships is to be clear about
their needs; "[t]hen love becomes no more than an exchange, with no binding rules except the
obligation of full and open communication." Id. at 108.
36 The movement from traditional to modem marriage has been examined by Francesca
Cancian. F. Cancian, Love in America: Gender and Self-Development (1987). Cancian
suggests that both husbands and wives in modem marriages assume roles that were formerly
differentiated by gender. Thus, in traditional marriage, love was feminized (i.e., women were
responsible for the emotional quality of marriage), and self-development was masculinized
(i.e., men were independent and sought success outside of the home). Today, self-development
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change, marriage has become an "exchange" relationship. 37 Husband
and wife are equal, autonomous parties, each pursuing emotional fulfillment through marriage. The relationship is sustained as long as it
produces "returns" for each party.
These evolving cultural norms are reflected in no-fault divorce law.
Marital breakdown is an event without moral connotations and
should be treated as such by the law. In Schneider's words, "[t]here
ought to be no sense of guilt when a marriage doesn't work, because
there was simply a technical dysfunction; there ought to be no sense
of prolonged responsibility, because that itself would be dysfunctional
.... ,38 No-fault divorce exemplifies the "doctrine of nonbinding
commitments. ' ' 39 The modem marriage is a relationship that should
be sustained only if it "works." "'[O]ptions' should be kept numerous and open to 'facilitate personal growth.' "40 Divorce law reflects
the conclusion that these values are best served by allowing quick and
simple exit from marriage.41
The law regulating marriage and divorce today does more than
refrain from moralistic prescriptions. It may even frustrate couples
who would bind themselves to the marital relationship. For example,
it is unclear whether a premarital contract establishing a three-year
waiting period upon notice of a desire to divorce by either party
would be enforceable in most states. 42 The message is clear; no bar-

rier should seriously hinder a decision at any time by either party that
the marriage should end.
is important to both men and women, as is emotional expression and fulfillment in marriage.
Id. at 4-8, 105-33.
37 Swidler, supra note 34, at 118-19 (citing a 1972 study of group relationships by Marcia
Millman). As Swidler points out, exchange imagery suggests a picture of marriage very
different from the traditional relationship. Individuals value marriage for what they get out of
it. Each individual is concerned about what he or she will take away when the relationship is
over. Exchange suggests autonomy rather than union; it also suggests impermanence. Id.
38 Schneider, supra note 1, at 1853.

39 See supra note 3.

40 Schneider, supra note 1, at 1855.
41 In Schneider's words, "This view prefers temporary marriages, temporary nonmarital
arrangements, and temporary children, and the law is coming to accommodate it." Id.

Schneider may be challenged here. I will argue that many people have a sense of moral
commitment to their children (although it may be overwhelmed by self-interest in the divorce
context). See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
42 For a discussion of the enforceability of contracts restricting divorce, see infra notes 17480 and accompanying text.
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The Challenge to Quick and Easy Divorce

Modem divorce law reinforces a pessimistic account of contemporary marriage as a relationship involving minimum commitment and
maximum self-gratification. It probably also reflects the preferences
of unhappy spouses desiring to end a marriage. As I will argue in this
Section, however, the law, in responding to the erosion of the moral
and religious framework that supported traditional marriage, has
embraced a version of the evolving norm of self-realization that distorts many, perhaps most, people's goals for marriage and family.
For many, the goal of self-fulfillment in marriage means substantial
investment in a long-term relationship, rather than short-term gratification and "nonbinding commitment." It also means raising one's
children in an intact family. The story of modem marriage told by
current law is one that often ends with children living with a single
parent in reduced economic circumstances, an outcome that most
people would avoid for their children, if possible. As I will demonstrate, social science research evidence strongly supports the conclusion that marital instability and divorce are harmful for children. If
this is so, and if many people are motivated to promote their children's welfare through family stability, then the law would do well to
encourage and reinforce this aspiration. Indeed, the persuasive evidence that children fare better in stable intact families argues for the
legal regime influencing the evolution of the self-realization norm
toward this objective.
1.

Commitment to Marriage and the Self-Realization Norm

Much that can be observed in modem culture suggests that Americans today may be motivated more by striving toward self-fulfilment
than by a sense of moral or religious duty.4 3 It does not follow from
this, however, that most people conceive of marriage as a relationship
of shallow commitment and easy dissolution.
There is much evidence of dissatisfaction with the "exchange"
model of marriage, at least as it currently functions. If media attention is a measure, the high divorce rate is perceived as a serious social
problem in this country. Academic critics bleakly depict modem
43 See Schneider, supra note 1.
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marriage as reflective of a society that embraces shallow values.44
This pessimistic view of marriage appears to assume that-having
rejected values that supported the traditional model-we are left with
only the alternative of marriage as an arrangement to promote the

selfish ends of each party. For some, the contrast makes traditional
marriage seem attractive.4 5

A different conception of marriage based on self-fulfillment is possible. In a recent historical and empirical study of marriage, Francesca
Cancian argues that commentators decrying the "culture of narcissism" have been overly pessimistic about the future of marriage and
family in our society.46 To be sure, a modern conception of marriage
has replaced the traditional ideal. Cancian argues, however, that critics fail to recognize that contemporary marriage need not signify tenuous commitment and the selfish pursuit of individual ends by each
partner (a norm that she calls the "independent model").4 7 To the

contrary, many modern couples aspire to a relationship conforming to
an "interdependent model," in which self-fulfillment is achieved only
through a lasting, satisfactory marriage, based on mutual dependence
and commitment.4a
44 Swidler links modem conceptions of adulthood and adult love with "a kind of empty
despair in high culture, abandoning hope for meaning, and in popular culture a shallow and
somewhat hysterical emphasis on protecting a childish version of the self." Swidler, supra note
34, at 123. See generally C. Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, supra note 6 (modem fear of
commitment due to uncertainty and instability).
45 The Reagan administration's emphasis on family values and the trend toward social
conservatism in the 1980's suggest feelings of nostalgia, as does the revival in Christian
fundamentalism with its emphasis on "the home, the family, [and] morality." Falwell, Revival
in America, in Individualism & Commitment, supra note 34, at 361.
46 F. Cancian, supra note 36, at 3.
47 Id. at 4-8, 105-33. Critics such as Lasch, Bellah, and others document the evolution of
the trend toward self-fulfillment at the expense of commitment to binding relationships. See
supra note 6. Other observers have argued that women cannot develop as individuals and
fulfill family roles. C. Degler, At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the
Revolution to the Present (1980); F. Cancian, supra note 36, at 3, 107 (citing S. Rothman,
Women's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices 1870 to the Present
(1978)). Cancian acknowledges that Lasch and Bellah do not deny the importance of intimacy
in modem love relationships; however, intimacy is not linked to commitment to an enduring
relationship but rather to emotional expression and fulfillment of individual needs and desires.
F. Cancian, supra note 36, at 8. Each individual should do her or his own thing. See id. at 9.
"Independent love" is ancillary to self-development. Id. at 8-9.
48 Cancian's conception of interdependent love links self-development to committed love.
Security and support of a committed relationship is deemed necessary to self-development. In
Cancian's view, the challenge to couples in an interdependent relationship is to avoid the
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In the beginning of this Article, I offered a story of marriage as a
committed long-term relationship and suggested that it describes the

aspiration of many people for their lives. This account conforms to
Cancian's interdependent model and to the (admittedly sketchy)
empirical evidence about personal aspirations for marriage. Many
people who enter marriage have both a current belief and intention
that the relationship will endure.4 9 If asked to describe their goals for

personal fulfillment, many would include a lasting, satisfying marriage and the establishment of a family. Most would concede that
even successful marriages have significant problems and that at times
the relationship would be unrewarding. Despite this, the anticipated

rewards of an enduring marriage justify a personal commitment to
"hang in there" through difficult times.50 In short, some people
surely believe that personal fulfillment is promoted by long-term
constraint of traditional gender roles and still to depend on each other for emotional and
material support. F. Cancian, supra note 36, at 122-33.
49 There is little rigorous social science research on this topic, but the survey data strongly
support this point. Surveys of young people indicate that they are optimistic about the success
of their own marriages. For example, a Glamour Magazine survey indicated that 89% of male
college students and 95% of female college students surveyed saw only one marriage in their
future. How College Women and Men Feel Today About Sex, Aids, Condoms, Kids: A
Campus Report, Glamour, Aug. 1987, at 261, 263. Two years earlier, 95% of men and 97%
of women agreed that "marriage is a lifetime commitment." What Do Women and Men
Expect of Marriage Today, Glamour, Feb. 1985. A public opinion survey of high school
seniors found that 85% thought that it was fairly likely that they would stay married to the
same person for life; in another study of high school seniors, over 80% of both sexes
considered it very likely, or fairly likely that they would stay married to the same person for
life; fewer than five percent thought such an outcome was fairly or very unlikely. Thornton &
Freedman, Changing Attitudes Toward Marriage and Single Life, 14 Fam. Plan. Persp. 297,
300 (1982). Cancian cites Scott Peck's best-selling guide to personal happiness, The Road Less
Traveled (1978). F. Cancian, supra note 36, at 9. Peck recognizes that individual growth is
"the ultimate goal of life," but admonishes that "significant journeys cannot be accomplished
without the nurture provided by a successful marriage . . ." Id. (quoting S. Peck, supra, at
168). The popularity of Peck's book may suggest that this message resonates with many
people.
50 Many people apparently believe that divorce is too readily available. According to a
Miami Herald phone survey in 1986, 79.6% of the people surveyed agreed with this statement:
"Divorce is so easy to get today that people don't really work as hard as they should to stay
married." Pub. Opinion Index, Nov. 4, 1986. A follow-up survey of teenagers found that 79%
of those age 13 through 17 believed it was too easy to get a divorce in this country; 72% felt
that most divorced couples had not tried hard enough to save their marriages. A Roper poll in
1982 found that a majority of those polled thought divorce laws should be stricter. H. Jacob,
supra note 21, at 83 (citing Gen. Soc. Surveys, 1972-1982, Chicago: Nat'l Opinion Research
Center, July 1982). Interestingly, this public attitude seems to have predated the reform in
divorce law. In 1966, only 13% of respondents to a poll thought divorce law was too strict.
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investment in marriage, rather than maximum freedom to pursue
immediate preferences.
Divorce law distorts contemporary norms by failing to recognize
that although many people aspire to self-fulfillment in marriage, their
short-term and long-term goals may conflict. Ready dissolution of
the currently unsatisfactory relationship may not promote self-realization over time. Further, the law's rejection of some characteristics
of traditional marriage such as commitment, responsibility, and
mutual dependence may have been precipitous. These qualities may
be important in modem marriage, not as ends in themselves, but
because they contribute to an exchange that promotes long-term personal fulfillment.
2. Divorce and the Impact on Children
If the current version of the self-realization norm endorsed by the
law promotes short-term rather than long-term goals, it may also distort commonly shared values regarding the role of children. For
many people, self-fulfillment includes having and rearing children to
adulthood with a marital partner. The value of children in a life plan
is both basic and complex; it derives from a desire to pass on a cultural and personal heritage, to instill values, skills, and interests, and
to enjoy the companionship of persons sharing a unique and insoluble
bond. These intentions for the role of family would appear to conflict
with legal and social norms that facilitate minimal commitment and
ready dissolution of marriage.
Parents may also value a stable marriage because of a sense of
responsibility toward their children. Although moral obligation has
likely diminished in importance as an influence on behavior generally,
most parents probably continue to feel responsible for their children's
welfare. 1 Parents may accept the widely shared belief that children
fare best growing up in a stable intact family, and they may seek to
provide this for their own children. Again, these goals are not supId. A Gallup poll taken the same year found that most people favored stricter divorce laws.
Pub. Opinion Surveys, Inc., Princeton, N.J., Feb. 20, 1966.
51 This is likely true even though self-sacrifice by parents for children may be deemed less
laudable today than when the moral obligation was the pervasive theme in family
relationships. The view that "parents have rights also" is frequently articulated. Swidler,
supra note 34, at 120-21.
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ported by the law; further, the widespread incidence of divorce suggests that many people fail to fulfill their intentions.
Several factors may at least partly explain why so many parents
"defect" from these long-term personal objectives. First, at some
intangible level, conflicting cultural signals about the meaning of selffulfillment and of marriage may influence behavior. Aspirations for
lasting marriage may conflict with the expectation of a sustained high
level of gratification. In a culture in which divorce is routine, disappointment of that expectation may lead quickly to thoughts of ending
the marriage. Second, I will argue in Part II that the context in which
unhappy spouses consider the decision to divorce may be subject to
cognitive biases and may promote emphasis on short-term rather than
long-term interests. In this setting, the parent's feeling of responsibility toward children may be discounted because of strong personal
preferences favoring divorce. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
a parent who cares about her children's welfare may believe that
although, in general, divorce is bad for children, in her case it is better
than the family's current unhappy situation. Thus, parents may
choose divorce as the better of two unfortunate alternatives for them
and their children.
If parents do consider the interests of their children in thinking
about divorce, it is not because the law encourages or helps them to
do so. In only a few states is the legal norm supporting the quick and
easy availability of divorce modified even slightly to encourage parents to consider the impact of the decision on their children.5 2 Parents are not required to justify their divorce by demonstrating that it
is not harmful to their children; nor are children represented in the
proceeding. Nowhere, for example, can a guardian ad litem argue to
the judge that the divorce is contrary to the child's best interest and
therefore should not be granted. 3 Only when the court turns to the
custody determination is the focus on the child's welfare; here, the
paramount concern that the law ostensibly has for the best interest of
52 In Virginia, divorce may be obtained after six months separation if the couple have no
minor children, one year if they do. Va. Code Ann. § 20-91(9)(a) (Supp. 1989).
53 A guardian ad litem may be appointed to represent the child in a contested custody
proceeding but the guardian has no role in the divorce decision. See generally Note,
Lawyering for the Child: Principles of Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes
Arising from Divorce, 87 Yale L.J. 1126 (1978) (discussing the function of a child's legal
representative in a child custody hearing as the protector of the child's best interest).
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the child is insistently emphasized.

4

The issue of whether the child's

best interest might be promoted by the parents' continued marriage is
never addressed.
That parents have a "right to divorce" without regard to the possible detriment to their children is taken for granted; on reflection it is
puzzling. The attention directed toward divorce as an important
social problem focuses on the harmful impact on minor children. Yet
children themselves are legally powerless to influence the divorce

decision, and in contrast to its typical response when children's welfare is threatened, the law 55does not assert their interests until after the
harmful decision is made.
a. Justificationsfor Excluding Children'sInterest
Two related arguments based on a libertarian privacy rationale
could be offered to support maximum freedom to divorce by parents.
First, it may be argued that decisions to divorce, like reproductive
choices, 56 are intimate personal decisions that are so important to the

individual that serious restraint by the state is intolerable, and indeed,
unconstitutional. This argument has some merit. Some restrictions,
such as an absolute bar to divorce, would be so onerous as to violate
54 See Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 386 (Alaska 1977) ("The literature discussing the
detrimental effects parental divorce can have on children is large and growing."). In focusing
on the best interest of the child as the basis for the custody award, courts have specifically held
that "[t]he best interest of the parent, or detriment to the parent, is not the test." In Re
Marriage of Tweeten, 172 Mont. 404, 406, 563 P.2d 1141, 1143 (1977).
55 The state has broad authority to intervene in the family in cases of child abuse and
neglect, based on its parens patriae power to protect the welfare of children. See generally
Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of
Children from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of Children in Foster Care, and
Termination of Parental Rights, 28 Stan. L. Rev 623 (1976) (discussing the present system for
removing neglected children from their parents and proposing a new system); Inst. Judicial
Admin. & Am. Bar Ass'n, Juvenile Justice Standards: Standards Relating to Abuse and
Neglect (Tentative Draft) (1977) (setting model guidelines for state intervention in abuse/
neglect cases).
56 See Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding statute
requiring husband's or parents' consent to abortion unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (holding that state prohibition of abortion prior to viability is violative of
constitutionally protected right of reproductive privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972) (holding that state may not prohibit sale of contraceptives to single people, because
right of reproductive privacy is right of individual, married or single, to decide whether to have
child).

28
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personal integrity.57 The analogy to reproductive privacy is tenuous,
however, and surely does not support a right to divorce without
restriction,5" particularly when the interests of third parties are
implicated.5 9

The constitutionally based tradition of legal deference to parental
authority provides another privacy-based argument favoring parental
freedom to divorce. The law generally presumes that parents will
consider their children's interests in making decisions that affect the

children's welfare; it typically does not interfere with parental authority absent evidence of a serious conflict of interest. 6° Respect for
parental authority, however, is balanced against the state's interest in
protecting children. If parents make decisions that harm their child's
61
interest, the state may intervene under its parens patriae authority.
Furthermore, in the context of divorce, the interest in parental auton57 Anthony Kronman argues that the law appropriately limits contractual freedom by
prohibiting contracts that bar divorce because they signify self-enslavement. Contracts of selfenslavement violate personal integrity because they offer no alternative to performance and
bind the individual to a course or venture that may now be irrational in light of changed goals.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763, 775-82 (1983).
58 The individual's interest in bodily privacy is far more directly implicated in reproductive
decisions than in the decision to divorce. In Roe, the Court emphasized the physical burden
on the woman forced against her will to endure pregnancy and childbirth. 410 U.S. at 153.
Constraints on divorce do not signify forced intimate relations with a spouse by an unwilling
partner. Indeed, the recent recognition of the crime of marital rape underscores that marital
sexual relations may not be forced. See State v. Smith, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981)
(husband not exempted from rape charge during separation). The right of reproductive
privacy itself is not an absolute right but may be subject to restrictions to protect viable fetuses
and the health of the mother. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
59 Libertarian philosophy emphasizes that personal freedom is not absolute, but is limited to
acts that do not harm others. John Stuart Mill described this as the "harm principle." J. Mill,
On Liberty 205 (Meridian Ed. 1969) (1857). Mill is very critical of the freedom given parents
to harm their children and suggests that parents have a moral responsibility to provide their
children with "at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence." Id. at 242. He
concludes, "we might imagine that a man had an indispensable right to do harm to others, and
no right at all to please himself .... " Id.
60 The Supreme Court has emphasized the constitutional basis of parental authority over
children as a constraint on state authority. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
(holding that under first and fourteenth amendments, Wisconsin may not require Amish
parents to send children to school until statutorily required age of 16); Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon statute requiring public school attendance struck down);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (Nebraska statute limiting foreign language
instruction in schools struck down as interference with parents' fourteenth amendment liberty
to rear children).
61 See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (holding that state under parens patriae
authority may restrict parent's authority to guide child's religious practice when child's
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omy becomes attenuated; state involvement occurs that would be
offensive to family privacy in an intact family. 62 Thus, although the

doctrine of family privacy limits state intrusion into the family, it does
not mandate or fully explain a legal regime that affords easy divorce,
regardless of the interests of children.
Perhaps the most persuasive justification for unrestricted availability of divorce is the empirical assumption that if either parent is sufficiently dissatisfied with the marriage to contemplate divorce, then
children may be more harmed by the continuation of the unhappy
marriage than by divorce. I have suggested that this belief may influence some parents contemplating divorce; it may also in part explain
the current legal stance, which otherwise seems inconsistent with a
strong tradition of child protection. Unfortunately, this somewhat
reassuring assumption finds little support in the extensive body of
empirical research on divorce. This research indicates that, in general, children suffer both economic and psychological harm when
their parents divorce.
b. Social Science Research Findings: The Effects of Divorce on
Children
L

Effects on PsychologicalAdjustment

There is substantial evidence that the process of going through their
parents' divorce and the resulting changes in their lives are psychologically costly for most children. 63 At a minimum, divorce involves significant stress and upheaval. The adjustment of most children is
disrupted substantially for a year or two after divorce; for some the
welfare is threatened). State authority to intervene in the family is derived from both parens
patriae and police power sources.
62 In part this is because the parents may be in conflict and cannot be presumed to
cooperate to make decisions in the child's interest. Courts typically defer to parents when they
are in agreement regarding custody arrangements, probably because they believe that
arrangements agreed to by parents are likely to be more stable than those imposed by courts.
However, courts have authority to supervise and change custody arrangements throughout the
child's minority if the noncustodial parent challenges existing arrangements based on changed
circumstances. This represents a continuing threat to the privacy of the family unit of the
custodial parent and child. See Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody
Decrees, 94 Yale LJ. 757 (1985).
63 See generally R. Emery, Marriage, Divorce, and Children's Adjustment (1988)
(description and analysis of the social science research on divorce and its impact on children).
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disruption continues to exert a harmful influence for many years.'
The child usually has less contact with one parent, and sometimes
with both, particularly if the primary caretaker goes to work for the
first time. 65 In the early years of a divorce, both parents tend to function poorly at a time when the child may especially need care and
stability.6 6 Divorce may result in important changes in children's
64 In one of the most respected longitudinal studies of children in divorced families, Mavis
Hetherington and her colleagues studied 72 preschoolers (half girls and half boys) who were
followed and evaluated for two years after divorce. This group was compared to a control
group of children in intact families. Hetherington, Cox & Cox, Effects of Divorce on Parents
and Children [hereinafter Hetherington, Effects of Divorce], in Nontraditional Families 233
(M. Lamb ed. 1982). Hetherington observed that children in divorced families functioned
worse than those in intact families at two months and one year but had improved substantially
by two years after divorce. Girls were more compliant than boys. In a six-year follow up, boys
in divorced families continued to be less compliant than boys in intact families. Hetherington,
Cox & Cox, Long-Term Effects of Divorce and Remarriage on the Adjustment of Children, 24
J. Am. Acad. Child Psychiatry 518, 527 (1985) [hereinafter Hetherington, Long-Term Effects];
see also Wallerstein & Kelly, Surviving the Breakup (1980) (children in this study improved 18
months after divorce; boys more likely to have continuing problems than girls).
Wallerstein conducted a 10-year follow up study in which she found long-term effects for
some children. J. Wallerstein & S. Blakeslee, Second Chances (1989). Children older at the
time of divorce experience more continuing anger and sadness 10 years later than younger
children. In general, the long-term effects-particularly for girls--seem to be more harmful
than had been previously believed. Wallerstein, Children of Divorce: Preliminary Report of a
Ten-Year Follow-up of Older Children and Adolescents, 24 J. Am. Acad. Child Psychiatry
545 (1985). Some girls may seem to have adjusted well after divorce and only show the
harmful effects as they reach adulthood and contemplate serious relationships themselves.
Wallerstein, Children After Divorce: Wounds That Don't Heal, N.Y. Times Mag., Jan. 22,
1989, at 20-21. Wallerstein's study is less scientifically rigorous than Hetherington's; a serious
limitation is the absence of a control group.
65 According to a national survey of children living with mothers, 50% of mothers reported
that their children had not seen their fathers in a year; only 17% saw their fathers as often as
once a week. Furstenberg, Peterson, Nord & Zill, The Life Course of Children of Divorce:
Marital Disruption and Parental Contact, 48 Am. Soc. Rev. 656, 662-66 (1983) [hereinafter
Furstenberg]. There is evidence that contact diminishes over time. Id. at 665. Hetherington
found that by two years after the divorce only 19 of the 48 middle class divorced fathers in her
study saw their children once a week or more. Hetherington, Cox & Cox, The Aftermath of
Divorce [hereinafter Hetherington], in Mother/Child, Father/Child Relationships 149, 163 (J.
Stevens & M. Mathews eds. 1978). Wallerstein and Kelly found many of the children they
studied wanted more contact with their fathers. Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 64, at 132-38.
66 Wallerstein & Kelly, supra note 64, at 26-34; Hetherington, Effects of Divorce, supra
note 64, at 245-50. Hetherington and other researchers have found that custodial mothers
were less communicative and affectionate with their children and more inconsistent and less
effective in setting limits than were mothers in intact families. Custodial mothers particularly
had problems dealing with their sons. Hetherington, Effects of Divorce, supra note 64, at 252.
Hetherington found that boys received more punishments than girls and less positive feedback.
Id. at 255. The parenting by custodial mothers had improved by two years after the divorce.
Id. at 251-60. Six years after divorce, mothers continued to be less effective in disciplining
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lives; children must often leave the family home, neighborhood,
friends, and school. In many divorced families, reduced income
results in significant economic deprivation. 7
Social scientists have attempted to measure the effect of divorce on
children by examining different indicators of adjustment. By almost
any measure divorce appears to be harmful to children. Compared to

children in intact families, and controlling for other variables associated with divorce, children of divorce exhibited more delinquent and

antisocial behavior,68 used more mental health services,6 9 and persons, but were as affectionate as mothers in intact families. Hetherington, Long-Term Effects,
supra note 64, at 527. Emery describes other research findings on deterioration in parenting.
Some parents become "overly permissive, rigid or emotionally dependent" on their children
although, after a period of adjustment, most parents improved in their functioning. R. Emery,
supra note 63, at 83. Some long-term disruptions were observed, particularly among mothers
who were depressed, were isolated from relatives and friends, experienced severe economic
concerns, or had several young children. Id. at 81-86. See generally Emery, Hetherington &
DiLalla, Divorce, Children and Social Policy, in Child Development Research and Social
Policy 189, 210-17 (H. Stevenson & A. Siegel eds. 1984) (discussing the difficulties experienced
by parents and children in adjusting to their new roles, as well as the inconsistent levels of
affection and discipline resulting from these new situations).
67 See infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the economic effects of
divorce.
68 See Douglas, Broken Families and Child Behaviour, 4 J. Royal C. Physicians 203 (1970).
See generally Anderson, Where's Dad? Paternal Deprivation and Delinquency, 18 Arch. Gen.
Psychiatry 641 (1968) (study of boys in juvenile detention school found that almost all had
experienced separation from paternal influence). Emery comments, "Divorce has consistently
been found to be associated with externalizing problems among children. There is little need
to review the research that substantiates this conclusion in detail because the association has
been so well documented." R. Emery, supra note 63, at 52. Emery cites numerous studies that
indicate that children of divorce evidence more aggressive and delinquent behavior than
children in intact families: Hetherington, Effects of Divorce, supra note 64, at 267-72 (finding
boys of divorce to be more disobedient and aggressive); Peterson & Zill, Marital Disruption,
Parent-Child Relationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, 48 J. Marriage & Fain. 295
(1986) (study finding that children of divorce tend to be more aggressive); Rutter, ParentChild Separation: Psychological Effects on the Children, 12 J. Child Psychology & Psychiatry
233 (1971) (same); see also M. Wadsworth, Roots of Delinquency 46-60 (1979) (tracing the
correlation between broken homes and juvenile delinquency); Felner, Farber & Primavera,
Children of Divorce, Stressful Life Events, and Transitions: A Framework for Preventive
Efforts, in Prevention in Mental Health: Research, Policy, and Practice 81 (R. Price, R.
Ketterer, B. Bader & J. Monahan eds. 1980) (discussing the consistency with which studies
have found antisocial behavior present in children of divorce). Some confusion in interpreting
the research findings has resulted because researchers have tended to group children whose
fathers were absent for any reason, rather than to look separately at children of divorce. R.
Emery, supra note 63, at 52-53.
69 Children of divorce are disproportionately represented in outpatient mental health clinic
populations. Kalter, Children of Divorce in an Outpatient Psychiatric Population, 47 Am. J.
Orthopsychiatry 40 (1977).
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formed worse in school. 70 Both boys and girls tend to differ
some71
what from children in intact families in sex role behavior.
For one group of children, the assumption that divorce promotes
their welfare may be valid. These are children whose parents engage

in intense conflict with each other during marriage that is greatly alleviated by the divorce. Exposure to high levels of interparental conflict
is associated with poor adjustment among children. 72 There is evi-

dence that children in single-parent homes with a low level of conflict
experience better adjustment than children in intact families with a
high level of conflict.7 3 There is no evidence, however, that divorce
70 Featherman and Houser found that men raised in single parent households had almost a
year less education than those raised in intact families. D. Featherman & R. Hauser,
Opportunity and Change 242-46 (1978). Differences increase as children grow older.
Hetherington, Effects of Divorce, supra note 64, at 272. Emery suggests that some of the
differences in academic performance may be explained by more disruptive behavior in school
and resulting teacher perceptions about children. See R. Emery, supra note 63, at 59-60.
71 The absence of a father may contribute to differences in boys' development of masculine
identity. Hetherington and her colleagues found that boys tended to have less traditional
same-sex preferences, as evidenced by game choices and sex role orientation check lists.
Hetherington, Effects of Divorce, supra note 64, at 275-77. The theory is that because fathers
have a more remote role in the child's life, boys of divorced parents do not have strong male
role models. Id. at 276. Other research has focused on the effect of divorce on children's
relationships with the opposite sex. Hetherington observed precocious and provocative
behavior by young adolescent girls whose parents were divorced. See Hetherington, Effects of
Father Absence on Personality Development in Adolescent Daughters, 7 Developmental
Psychology 313 (1972). There has been declining interest in this research focus with greater
acceptance of more flexible sex roles in recent years. See R. Emery, supra note 63, at 60.
72 There is substantial research support for this proposition. Ellison, Issues Concerning
Parental Harmony and Children's Psychosocial Adjustment, 53 Am. J. Orthopsychiatry 73
(1983); Emery & O'Leary, Children's Perceptions of Marital Discord and Behavior Problems
of Boys and Girls, 10 J. Abnormal Child Psychology 11 (1982); McCord, McCord & Thurber,
Some Effects of Paternal Absence on Male Children, 64 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychology 361
(1962). An excellent overview and analysis is provided by Emery, Interparental Conflict and
the Children of Discord and Divorce, 92 Psychological Bull. 310 (1982). See generally Rutter,
Protective Factors in Children's Responses to Stress and Disadvantage, in 3 Primary
Prevention of Psychopathology: Social Competence in Children 49 (M. Kent & J. Rolf eds.
1979) (analyzing the factors that enable some children to overcome the adverse effects of stress
in the home).
73 Hetherington, Family Interaction and the Social, Emotional, and Cognitive Development
of Children After Divorce, in The Family: Setting Priorities (V. Vaughan & T. Brazelton eds.
1979). This study divided participants into four groups: high-conflict divorced parents, low-tomoderate conflict divorced parents, high-conflict married parents, and low-to-moderate
conflict married parents. The findings suggested that children in high-conflict divorced
families had the greatest adjustment problems, followed by children in high-conflict intact
families. Low-conflict divorced families had fewer adjustment problems, and low-conflict
intact families had the lowest level. Chess found that exposure of three-year-old children to
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promotes children's adjustment if the conflict continues or if the level
of open conflict in the intact family is moderate-despite the fact that
one or both parents may be dissatisfied with the marriage. If the child

is not confronted regularly with the parents' anger and hostility
toward each other, then the continuity and stability of an intact family may promote better adjustment. It is plausible that, unless conflict
escalates, "staying married for the sake of the children" may indeed
be better for the children in many families.

2.

The Economic Impact of Divorce on Children
Children who are in their mothers' custody (approximately ninety
percent of all children of divorce) experience a significant decline in
family income from their predivorce status, while noncustodial
fathers experience an increase in their income level. Although the
extent of the economic impact of divorce is disputed, the fact is not.7 4

high levels of interparental conflict correlated with later poor adjustment as young adults,
whether or not the parents eventually separated. See Chess, Thomas, Kom, Mittelman &
Cohen, Early Parental Attitudes, Divorce and Separation, and Young Adult Outcome:
Findings of a Longitudinal Study, 22 J. Am. Acad. Child Psychiatry 47 (1983). Children who
experience a postdivorce reduction in family conflict show improvements in adjustment. See
Rutter, supra note 72, at 67.
74 Lenore Weitzman found that mothers and children underwent a 73% decline in their
income, while fathers experienced a 42% increase after divorce. Weitzman, The Economics of
Divorce: Social and Economical Consequences of Property, Alimony and Child Support
Awards, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1181, 1251 (1981). Weitzman's conclusions regarding this change
in the standard of living of divorced men and women were based on interviews of 114 divorced
men and 114 divorced women in Los Angeles County in 1978. Id. at 1187. She compared the
spouses' predivorce standard of living in 1977 to their postdivorce standard of living one year
after the divorce in 1978. See generally L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The
Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America (1985)
(explaining the methods used in her interviews of 114 divorced men and 114 divorced women
in Los Angeles County in 1978 and the results obtained). For a criticism of Weitzman's
methodology, see Jacob, Faulting No-Fault, 1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 773.
Saul Hoffman, using a better sample than Weitzman's, repeated measurement, and longer
time lags, found a less dramatic but still substantial decrease in income for women and
children and increase for men. Hoffman found, after adjusting for family needs, that divorced
women experienced a 6.7% decline in living standards, divorced men a 16.5% gain, and
married couples a 20.8% gain over a six-year period. Hoffman, Marital Instability and the
Economic Status of Women, 14 Demography 67, 69 (1977). Hoffman studied the changing
incomes of 2,400 women using data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(MPSID). He found that the real income (before adjustment) of couples remaining married
over a six year period increased by 21.7%. The income of divorced women decreased by
29.3% and that of divorced men by 19.2%. Id.; see also Espenshade, The Economic
Consequences of Divorce, 41 J. Marriage & Fam. 615, 618-19 (1979) (finding that men were in
a better economic position as a result of divorce, while the economic position of women
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This economic decline is not only a direct cost of divorce but is often
associated with other stressful disruptions such as leaving the family
home, changing schools, leaving friends, and placement in child care.
It has been suggested that many of the psychological difficulties

experienced by children after divorce may be related to economic
hardship.7 5
An important reason for the decline in economic status of children
of divorce is the failure of many divorced fathers to provide adequate
financial support to their children.7 6 Contributing to poor compliance
declined). Espenshade also used the MPSID data. He found that children who remained in
their mother's custody experienced a 13.8% decline in real family income. Children who were
in their father's custody fared much better, with an increase of 49.4% in real family income.
He points out that in these cases, fathers may have been awarded custody because they were
economically in a good position to care for children. Id. at 619.
75 See R. Emery, supra note 63, at 102. Several reasons have been offered for this decline in
children's economic status. Benefits of economies of scale are lost in the divorced family in
which the income must support two households. Men typically enjoy significantly higher
incomes and earning capacity; after divorce, custodial mothers and children no longer share
proportionally in family income. For example, a family of four may live on the father's income
of $50,000 a year. Upon divorce, the child support arrangements typically result in the mother
and two children living on 30% of that income and whatever income the mother can earn. For
income in the two households to be equalized, a far larger percentage of the father's income
would have to go to child support. Judicial reluctance to increase child support is
understandable, because to do so would probably result in even poorer compliance with child
support orders than currently exists. Some observers have criticized judges for awarding less
child support than the noncustodial parent can afford and typically half of what it costs to
raise a child. It has been suggested that judges are simply ignorant of the actual costs of childraising and greatly underestimate it; the custodial parent must make up any expense not taken
into account by the judge. Bruch, Developing Standards for Child Support Payments: A
Critique of Current Practice, 16 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 49 (1982).
One response to the costs created by the children's economic status would be to award
custody to the more financially secure parent. Few observers, however, think that this is an
appropriate remedy. First, substantial unfairness would result if the parent whose financial
position is less secure, because she took care of the children rather than worked, would
therefore be disadvantaged in a custody dispute. Presumably the allocation of work and child
care roles are agreed upon by the couple. Second, there is consensus that the relationship
between parent and child is a more significant criterion than the parent's economic status.
Finally, because both parents are financially responsible for the child, effective income shifting
for the child's benefit would seem to be a superior response.
76 Of those mothers awarded child support in 1984, only 50.5% reported receiving the full
amount due even in the first year; 25.5% received partial payment and 24% received none of
the court-ordered payment. See I. Ellman, supra note 23, at 380. Fathers who start out by
making regular payments pay less, or even nothing, as time goes on. See Chambers, The
Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child Support, 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1614, 1623 (1982).
There are two principal reasons why the enforcement of child support obligations is so
difficult. First, the parent may not have the financial resources to make the payments, a fact
that is complicated by the increased financial burdens of remarriage. Second, there are
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with child support obligations is the fact that many fathers remarry
soon
after divorce and assume financial responsibility for a new family. 77 Emotional ties to children in the new family may weaken interest in and commitment to the children of divorce. Limited financial
resources are more likely to be directed to the new family.
The policy of modem divorce law may contribute to the financial
insecurity of children. Efficient termination of the relationship and
problems in locating noncustodial parents and collecting payments in jurisdictions other than
the one issuing the support order. The Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act (RURESA), which has been adopted by 37 states, is a remedy directed at this problem.
9B U.L.A. 381 (1987). It provides for collection of child support across state and county lines.
More recently, Congress enacted the 1984 Child Support Enforcement Amendments to Title
IV of the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 654-67 (Supp. V 1987). These provisions function
to compel states to institute certain child support enforcement mechanisms. For instance,
states are required to set up two new forms of enforcement: the interception of state and
federal income tax refunds and a system for withholding of child support from the obligor's
wages. 42 U.S.C. §§ 664(a), 666(a)(1), 666(a)(3), 666(b) (Supp. V 1987). Other provisions are
discretionary. This law requires states to develop guidelines for determination of support
awards. 42 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. V 1987). Federal regulations provide guidelines as to specific
items state agencies are to include in their formulas for determining support payments, but
these guidelines are not binding in ajudicial proceeding. 45 C.F.R. §§ 302.53, .56 (1988). See
generally H. Clark, supra note 26, at 735-39 (describing the scope and effect of the federal
regulations).
77 One study concluded that 80% of men and 70% of women remarry within six years of
divorce. Hetherington, Effects of Divorce, supra note 64, at 281 (results of study in Virginia;
authors caution against overgeneralizing results). Twenty-five percent of children spend time
in a stepparent family before they are young adults. Furstenberg, The New Extended Family:
The Experience of Parents and Children After Remarriage, in Remarriage and Stepparenting:
Current Research and Theory 42, 44 (1987). About half of divorced persons remarry within
three years. See Chambers, supra note 76, at 1624 (citing Koo & Suchindran, Effects of
Children on Women's Remarriage Prospects, 1 J. Fam. Issues 497 (1980) (1975 study of
childless white females divorced for the first time)). Almost 40% of children whose parent
remarries experience a second divorce. Furstenberg, supra note 65, at 661. Of young women
who divorce under age 35, 50% of those who subsequently remarry do so within two and a
half years. See Koo & Suchindran, supra, at 505. This may be due in part to the incentive to
obtain additional financial support for children. The economic status of custodial mothers was
largely determined by whether or not they remarried; divorced women who remarried were far
better off economically than those who did not. See Duncan & Hoffman, A Reconsideration of
the Economic Consequences of Marital Dissolution, 22 Demography 485 (1985). The
economic well-being of women decreases when their former husbands remarry; women who
themselves remarry but whose husbands do not are economically better off than those whose
husbands also remarry. Buehler, Hogan, Robinson & Levy, Remarriage Following Divorce:
Stressors and Well-Being of Custodial and Noncustodial Parents, 7 J. Fam. Issues 405, 416-17
(1986). See generally S. Albrecht, H. Bahr & K. Goodman, Divorce and Remarriage:
Problems, Adaptations, and Adjustments (1983) [hereinafter S. Albrecht]. Of course, the
dependence of the new wife and her children on the subsequent husband will make him less
able to provide support to children of an earlier marriage.
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disentanglement of economic ties allows adults to get on with their
lives, free of financial and other ties to former spouses. It permits
them to assume quickly new family financial burdens. This may contribute to the attenuated sense of financial responsibility and to a

reduced capability of meeting obligations toward children of the broken marriage, a response reflected in the poor rate of compliance with
child support orders. In every regard except child support, modem

divorce law encourages parties to put the marriage behind them.
Many fathers apparently adopt the general norm and fail to preserve
their parental role and responsibility. 78 In this way, the law's objective of efficient division and final settlement may inadvertently exacerbate the costs of divorce for children.7 9
78 David Chambers has argued that the time may come when legally compelled child
support may be limited to a few years duration. See Chambers, supra note 76, at 1631-34.
This could come about, according to Chambers, if the social consensus weakens that
noncustodial parents have a moral responsibility to their children. Chambers points out that
although there seems to be consensus today that moral responsibility to children exists, many
noncustodial parents do not act upon it. Chambers states that
the pre-separation standard of living of the mother, father and child (would cease to be)
the relevant touchstone for deciding whether the new unit of one parent and child has
enough income. Such changes in the concept of family might well not be good for
children, any more than the increase in the rate of divorce itself has been good for
children. That's just the way it would be.
Id. at 1622-23. "Neither love nor a sense of moral responsibility induces most absent parents
to pay as much as they could." Id. at 1623.
79 Mary Ann Glendon has proposed an alternative scheme, a "family property" model, that
preserves family assets for the children's support, rather than promoting quick division of
property on divorce. She refers to this as the "children-first principle." In effect, the court
would place a lien on all the parents' property and income to provide for the needs of the
children of the marriage. Upon divorce, no property would be divided according to marital
property law until the children's welfare is adequately secured. The principle emphasizes that
marriages with and without children should be treated differently because of their different
social, political, and moral implications. See M. Glendon, The New Family and the New
Property 82 (1981); Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 La. L. Rev. 1553, 1558-60
(1984); Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 1165, 1172-76 (1986); Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of
Marriage, in The Cambridge Lectures 1981, at 245 (1983). Glendon has described the British
approach to financial settlements in divorces involving children. She refers to a British Law
Commission Report, which noted that children under 16 were involved in 60% of divorces and
observed that
'[i]n such cases it may well be thought that the primary concern must be for a broken
family rather than a broken marriage: and that the welfare of the children, social,
psychological, and economic, should take precedence over the adjustment of the
financial rights and duties of the former spouses towards each other.'
M. Glendon, supra, at 84 (quoting The Law Commission, The Financial Consequences of
Divorce, 103 L. Commission 3-4 (1980)).
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In sum, although not every child will suffer from her parents'
divorce, and some may benefit from the change, there is substantial
evidence of pervasive psychological and economic detriment to children when parents decide to divorce. The empirical evidence supports the commonly held intuition that divorce is bad for children.
The projection that, at current divorce rates, fifty percent of children
in this country will experience the divorce of their parents during
their minority is a statistic that suggests a troubling social problem.
Further, except in cases of extreme interparental conflict, little evidence supports the reassuring assumption that divorce is better for
children if either parent is unhappy with the marriage.80 What does
not seem debatable is that children in general are harmed by divorce
and are better off if their parents realize their goal of marital stability
than if they fail to do so.
3.

Summary

Two inconsistent expressions of a cultural norm defining self-realization may influence the goals and behavior of married persons. The
first is reflected in aspirations to invest in a rewarding long-term relationship and to raise children in a stable home. The second is represented by the goal of promoting maximum individual freedom to
pursue current preferences in relationships. The second norm is reinforced by modem divorce law, a value choice that is puzzling in its
preference for short-term over long-term goals, and disturbing in that
it may promote decisions by parents that may harm their children.
Empirical research clearly associates divorce with detrimental effects
on children. If the law condones the harm by facilitating quick and
easy divorce, then some reevaluation is in order in light of the state's
responsibility toward children's welfare. Moreover, the aspiration of
many people for a lasting marriage offers an opportunity for the law
to influence the evolving ideology of marriage so that legal rules may
better reflect values of commitment and relationship.
so Of course, this assumption cannot be directly "disproved" by the research. Empirical
resolution of this issue would require studies comparing couples who stayed married although
at least one partner wanted divorce with couples who divorced and evaluating the impact on
their children. Such studies have not been done. The large body of existing research does
challenge the presumption that divorce is less harmful than the alternative because divorce
involves significant harm, and the effects of the alternative are unknown.
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A PRECOMMITMENT PERSPECTIVE ON MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE DECISIONS

This Part begins with the premise that for many people, self-fulfillment and marital stability are linked, and that in the decision to
divorce they have acknowledged their failure to achieve long-term
goals both for themselves and for their children. Applying precommitment theory to the marital relationship, I will demonstrate that
people entering marriage could reinforce their original commitment
to a lasting relationship through strategies that would make divorce
more costly. Precommitment mechanisms could discourage impulsive or erroneous divorce, thereby enhancing careful and more accurate consideration of the decision. By imposing additional costs on
divorce, precommitments also would indirectly encourage cooperative
behavior during marriage and promote more careful consideration of
the decision to marry.
Despite their promise, however, precommitment strategies may not
function properly in all cases. Long-term goals may change, turning
precommitments into obstacles to self-fulfillment. Further, cognitive
biases may distort premarital decisionmaking, a problem that raises
questions about the ability of individuals to gauge their long-term
interests accurately in this setting.
I conclude, however, that although precommitment mechanisms
involve a risk of error as well as some limits on personal freedom,
some persons may choose to assume these risks in pursuit of longterm goals of marriage. No strong paternalistic claim argues against
permitting them voluntarily to opt into such binding agreements.
Indeed, socially imposed precommitments may be justified when children as well as adults may benefit. Thus, the application of precommitment theory to behavior and attitude change in marriage may have
a dual focus. Most directly, precommitment theory suggests how
couples may use simple mechanisms to reinforce their intentions for
lasting marriage. More intangibly, the theory offers a framework for
legal transformation of the conception of marriage from a "nonbinding" and transitory bond to a more enduring relationship.
A.

The Causes of MaritalFailure

Even though many people aspire to permanent relationships, marriages often end in divorce. The causes of marital failure have been
much examined. At the risk of great oversimplification, it is useful to
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think of marriages that break down as falling into one of three general
categories. The first is the marriage that is a mistake at the outset.
The individuals entering marriage lack adequate information about
each other or about themselves (or they do not carefully consider
available information) and the information, once received and
weighed, makes the marriage seem untenable.8 1 In the second category, one or both persons change so fundamentally from the time of
marriage that, at the time of divorce, they are, in some sense, "different persons," who are no longer compatible and no longer share values or goals. 2 In the third category, failed marriages result because,
over time, marriage is vulnerable to many stresses, and simply having
a commitment at the outset is sometimes not enough to get through
difficult times. Predictable stresses may include boredom, economic
problems, conflict over children, the competition of other relationships or of career, mid-life crises, illnesses, and family tragedies. In
response to these stresses, the exercise of individual resolve simply
may not be sufficient to maintain the original objective of making the
marriage succeed. 8 3 In terms of short-term personal happiness, the
costs of staying in the marriage during times of stress may outweigh
the costs of leaving and pursuing other alternatives. Today, there are
81A large percentage of marriages that end in divorce do so within the first seven years. It
seems probable that at least a substantial percentage of these fit into this first category of
marriages based on inadequate information. The most extreme case, of course, would be a
situation in which the marriage was based on a material misrepresentation by one party. Such
fraud would be the basis for annulment. More typical would probably be a marriage based on
a short relationship or a relationship that was limited in the extent to which it allowed each
individual to get to know all aspects of the other's personality. Impulsive marriages may be
more typical among young couples. Youth at the time of marriage is the factor most
correlated with marital instability. For example, marriages of men in their teens are three
times as likely to result in divorce during the first five years of marriage as those of men who
marry in their late twenties. Glick & Norton, Frequency, Duration, and Probability of
Marriage and Divorce, 33 J. Marriage & Fam. 307, 310, 315 (1971); see Bumpass & Sweet,
Differentials in Marital Instability: 1970, 37 Am. Soc. Rev. 754, 755-56 (1972); Kitson &
Raschke, Divorce Research: What We Know; What We Need to Know, J. Divorce, Spring
1981, at 1, 12-13.
82 Many marriages between very young persons that end in divorce may belong in this
category. The high divorce rate in teenage marriages may relate to the likelihood that persons
who marry before the age of 20 may still be dealing with issues of adolescence. Their identities
may not be fully formed. See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
83 Stresses are likely to have a cumulative erosive effect on marital stability over time.
Probably less common is the single destabilizing event, such as a death or illness, that leads to
the failure of a marriage.
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few religious and no legal restraints to reinforce the initial commitment and to provide additional barriers to exit.
The analysis that follows will initially assume that individuals who
divorce fall into the third category described above: marital failure
caused by a series of stresses and choices that eventually lead to
divorce. I will then relax this assumption and examine the implications of the analysis for other categories of marital failure.
B.

Introducingthe Precommitment Perspective

1. Introduction
At least since Ulysses told his crew to tie him to the mast so that he
would not yield to the entreaties of the sirens, 4 (and undoubtedly
long before this), people have used precommitment strategies as a
means of self-management. These strategies are useful in situations in
which an individual has a long-term preference or goal that she anticipates will conflict on some occasions with temporarily dominant
short-term preferences. Through ex ante precommitment devices, the
person can reinforce long-term goals, thereby mitigating the problem
of inconsistent choices. For example, an individual may decide that
choice A (to stop smoking) reflects his consistent long-term interest
and preference. He also knows, however, that because of his weak
will, choice B (to smoke) may sometimes appear more attractive.
Therefore he devises in advance a strategy to discourage himself from
acting on his short-term preference. He may impose costs on choice
B (inviting public ridicule by announcing that he has stopped smoking), or provide rewards if he adheres to choice A (a new stereo if he
refrains for six months). He may devise rules that allow him to avoid
confronting choice B (a mandatory three-hour wait before smoking).
Finally, he may simply exclude it as an option (throw out the cigarettes and go for a walk in the woods).
The problem of inconsistent preferences has been of interest both to
psychologists and economists as a seeming contradiction to the standard assumption that individuals make choices and order their prefer85
ences by maximizing their expected utilities at any point in time.
Modem academic interest in precommitment probably began in the
84 Homer, The Odyssey, Book XII, lines 39-54, 177-79 (R. Lattimore trans. 1965).

85 For a discussion of the work of economists and psychologists in developing modem
precommitment theory, see infra note 87.
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1950's with an article by R.H. Strotz, who first demonstrated that
individuals will tend to make choices inconsistent with optimal plans,
assuming a tendency to discount the future, despite the fact that they
have constant ordering of preferences.8 6 Strotz suggests that one
87
response is to precommit to preclude future inconsistent options.
Precommitment strategies represent a conscious attempt to reduce
one's future options because subsequent preferences may be impulsive
or contrary to one's long-term interests. Precommitment is thus a
recognition of weak will. However, it is not directed at strengthening
the will,"8 but at manipulating, ex ante, the costs, benefits, and availability of different options. Precommitment is also not a hedge against
86 See Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 Rev. Econ.
Stud. 165 (1955-56).
87 Id. at 173. George Ainslie, a psychologist, focused on the mechanics of controlling
impulsive behavior. He examined precommitment devices as means to avoid temporarily
attractive short-term ("specious") rewards inconsistent with later, larger rewards. Ainslie,
Behavioral Economics II: Motivated, Involuntary Behavior, 23 Soc. Sci. Info. 47, 54-55
(1984); Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse
Control, 82 Psychological Bull. 463, 476-93 (1975). Thomas Schelling, a political economist,
has enlivened the discussion of precommitment and self-command strategies with many
illustrations of the use of these strategies from everyday life; smoking clinics, Christmas
savings clubs, and diet clubs are all examples. See T. Schelling, Choice and Consequence 83112 (1984); Schelling, Egonomics, or the Art of Self-Management, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers
and Proc.) 290 (1978); Schelling, Self-Command in Practice, in Policy, and in a Theory of
Rational Choice, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. (Papers and Proc.) 1, 6-7 (1984) [hereinafter Schelling,
Self-Command]. Jon Elster has described the impact of weakness of will on human capacity
for perfectly rational behavior, which would take all future preferences into account.
Precommitment strategies represent responses to imperfectly rational behavior. J. Elster,
Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality 36-47 (1979). Richard Thaler
and H. M. Shefrin use a model derived from agency theory to explain the decisionmaking
process to resolve conflicts between long-term and short-term interests. In Thaler and
Schefrin's model, each individual decisionmaker consists of a principal (the "planner") and
many agents (the "doers"). The planner, like the rational decisionmaker, is capable of taking
into account the individual's prospective utility over a lifetime. Each doer makes decisions
only for a short time period and has preferences that take only that time period into account.
Thus, in order to pursue a rational life plan, the planner must control each doer to ensure that
long range objectives are taken into account and that decisions are not based just on the
preferences of the moment. The planner's preferences are consistent over time while each
doer's preferences, focusing on its immediate time frame, will discount the future. Thaler &
Shefrin, An Economic Theory of Self-Control, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 392, 393-96, 404 (1981); see
Shefrin & Thaler, Rules and Discretion in a Two-Self Model of Intertemporal Choice (Cornell
Univ. Graduate School of Business and Pub. Admin., working paper no. 80-07) (1980).
88 In Schelling's words,
What I'm talking about is different from what is usually thought of as self-control or
self-discipline. I am not talking about the development of inner strength, character, or
moral fiber, or the change in values that goes with religious conversion. Nor am I
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"true" changing preferences. 8 9 The "reformed" alcoholic, reaching
for a drink, is not acting on new long-term preferences but on temporarily dominant short-term preferences. Precommitment strategies
reinforce self-control and enable the individual to adhere to the initial
utility-maximizing plan. 90
2. Precommitment Strategies in Marriage
In order to test whether precommitment strategies may function to
reinforce commitment to the marriage relationship, I will assume initially that, for many persons, marriage (and remaining married) represent "rational" decisions that take into account long-term interests,
and divorce results from choices that reflect short-term preferences.
This is basically a restatement, in the language of precommitment theory, of the aspirational norm for marriage and family that I have
described.
Marriage partners who enter the relationship committed to its success may over time make choices or engage in behavior inconsistent
with that goal. Predictable strains in any long-term relationship may
lead to destabilizing responses. Withdrawal, boredom, pursuit of
other relationships, immersion in career, and conflict over finances,
children, and other family may all weaken the resolve to sustain a
lasting relationship and may ultimately lead to marital breakdown. 9 1
Precommitment strategies can promote choices that reinforce the
talking about education in the consequences of behavior-lung and heart disease from
smoking, spoiled careers and families and livers from alcohol...

T. Schelling, supra note 87, at 69.
89 Indeed, if long-term preferences truly change, the precommitment becomes a worthless

or even harmful constraint. See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
90 It is possible in some situations that the initial plan, although consistent with long-term
preference, would not be generally perceived as utility maximizing. For example, the anorectic
who devises strategies to avoid eating is acting against long-term interests by most measures,
and the binge that represents temporarily dominant short-term preferences may be more
consistent with actual long-term interests.
91 In one study of marital breakdown, individuals cited infidelity, lack of love, emotional
problems, and financial problems as the major reasons why marriage failed. S. Albrecht, supra
note 77, at 99-101. Of course, it may not be possible to assess the nature of marital problems
from the behavior itself. Behavior such as infidelity, conflict, and devoting excessive amounts
of time to professional rather than family concerns may represent a temporary straying from
one's long-term objectives; alternatively, such behavior may signify true changed preferences.
It seems at least plausible that one path to marital breakdown involves small steps, none of
which, at least in the early stages, is directed to this outcome. Avoiding the path altogether
makes it less likely that the point will be reached when divorce is desired. Schelling has
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original commitment and discourage decisions and behavior that are
inconsistent with the long-term commitment, including the decision
to leave the marriage.
Couples may recognize that stresses will pose threats to the marriage and therefore may make informal precommitments to reinforce
the objective of a stable, lasting marriage. They may agree to rules
against behavior that threatens the marriage (flirting, adultery), rules
promoting resolution of problems ("never go to bed angry"), understandings that reduce conflict ("your family visits when I'm away"),
rules about time spent together and time spent with others. Such
rules of thumb or understandings likely exist in most successful marriages. They restrict behavior that may momentarily seem appealing
in the interest of the stability of the marriage over time. Probably
most of these rules are not designed to discourage divorce directly but
rather to influence the parties' behavior during marriage in ways that
support the relationship. 92 These mechanisms are unlikely to be
legally enforceable, and indeed most would not be suited to legal
enforcement. Of the strategies currently used, only prenuptial economic agreements would be legally enforceable if found equitable by a
court.
A variety of binding precommitment options would, of course, theoretically be possible. The most extreme would be a legal prohibition
against divorce. Like Ulysses, the married individual would be irrevocably bound to the original choice. In terms of precommitment
analysis, a no-exit rule would make the inconsistent short-term preference unavailable (theoretically), forcing the individual to abide by the
commitment. 93 Less extreme precommitment mechanisms could
impose costs on the decision to divorce and directly or indirectly supemphasized the importance of avoiding precursor behavior that may lead to the undesired
choice. Scheling, Self-Command, supra note 87, at 6-7.
92 If the objective is to avoid divorce, these rules of thumb and understandings are
mechanisms to avoid precursor behaviors that may threaten marital stability. See Schelling,
The Intimate Contest for Self-Command, Pub. Interest, Summer 1980, at 94, 114.
93 A fully enforceable no-exit rule is not feasible either constitutionally or practically. See
supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of constitutional limits on restraints
on divorce. The experience of countries that do not allow divorce would suggest that desertion

or separation is likely to be a substitute. See M. Rheinstein, supra note 21, at 158. Moreover,
the costs of a no-exit rule would be high in cases in which the decision to marry was erroneous
or in which true changed preferences have made the decision to leave the marriage the rational

choice.
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port the choice to continue in the marriage. A couple could agree

before marriage to impose economic penalties, benefiting the spouse
or children, on the partner seeking divorce. 94 Some precommitment
mechanisms would impose costs on the decision to divorce, while at

the same time discouraging impulsiveness. An agreement or a legal
rule9 5 requiring mandatory delay before divorce (a two- or three-year

waiting period, for example) would discourage impulsive divorce and
provide sufficient opportunity for a reconciliation. 96 A similar effect
would result from an agreement to submit to counseling, mediation,
or arbitration, or a requirement of psychological evaluation of the
children to assess the probable effect of divorce. 97

Precommitment mechanisms such as these, by imposing costs on
divorce or reinforcing continued marriage, potentially function to
promote marital stability in three ways: They may directly burden the
decision to divorce, indirectly promote cooperative behavior during
marriage, and encourage careful decisionmaking about marriage.
Each of these effects may assist married persons toward fulfillment of
their goals for marriage and family.
C. A Social PsychologicalModelfor Divorce Decisionmaking

Precommitment mechanisms that impose costs on the decision to
leave a marriage will discourage divorce only if the process of making
the decision is influenced by a calculation of costs. 98 Thus, in order to
94 A precommitment benefiting children may require a certain level of enforceable child
support or a designation of family property to go to the children (such as the family home). A
more novel suggestion would be a monetary fine paid by the party who leaves the marriage to
benefit the children upon divorce. Penalties benefiting the children would have a dual purpose;
they would not only deter divorce but would reinforce another dimension of the original
commitment for many persons, the responsibility to their future children, that would dictate
that an adequate level of financial support be provided if the marriage should fail. This
objective, like the commitment to the marriage, may erode in the context, of divorce.
95 In theory, the precommitment, mechanism is intrinsically a voluntary undertaking.
However, it is possible to adopt mandatory rules reflecting the goals of the initial commitment
if one is only bound by the rules by voluntarily getting married. For a discussion of mandatory
rules as precommitments, see infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
96 The divorce decision is more likely to reflect long-term preferences if a substantial delay
is required. Further, mandatory (although shorter) waiting periods before marriage would
promote careful decisionmaking at the outset and discourage impulsive marriages. See infra
notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
97 See infra notes 162-65 and accompanying text.
98 Thus, for example, if the decision is based primarily on emotional impulse, then
precommitment mechanisms would not function as predicted.
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analyze the effects of precommitment strategies, it is necessary first to
examine how individuals make the decision to divorce. Social psychologists have studied divorce decisionmaking and devised theoretical decisionmaking models conforming to the empirical research. 99

These models share many common features and consistently describe
the decision to divorce as a calculus in which the individual weighs
the costs and benefits of remaining in the marriage with those of
divorce. For example, under the model offered by George Levinger,

the most comprehensive social psychological model of marital dissolution," °° the strength and stability of a marriage are a function of the
intrinsic attractions of the marriage and of the barriers around it and
an inverse function of the attractions of alternatives.
A key insight of Levinger and others who have described the
divorce decisionmaking process is that the extent to which the mar-

riage itself is satisfactory is only one variable in predicting the
probability of divorce.10 1 The divorce decision may also be influenced
99 There are two leading social psychology models of divorce decisionmaking. The first is
an adaption of the theoretical small group behavior model of John Thibaut and Harold Kelley.
J. Thibaut & H. Kelley, The Social Psychology of Groups (1959). Several researchers have
adapted Thibaut and Kelley's model to divorce decisions. See, e.g., S. Albrecht, supra note 77,
at 94-101 (applying the model to determine the causes of divorce); Albrecht & Kunz, The
Decision to Divorce: A Social Exchange Perspective, 3 J. Divorce 319, 320-22 (1980) (same);
Edwards & Saunders, Coming Apart: A Model of the Marital Dissolution Decision, 43 J.
Marriage & Fam. 379 (1981) (combining several social psychological models including
Levinger's and Thibaut and Kelley's). The other model, by George Levinger, focuses directly
on marital instability and dissolution. Levinger's model draws on the Thibaut and Kelley
model but is not a direct adaptation. Levinger, A Social Psychological Perspective on Marital
Dissolution [hereinafter Levinger, A Social Psychological Perspective], in Divorce and
Separation: Context, Causes, and Consequences 37-60 (G. Levinger & 0. Moles eds. 1979)
[hereinafter Divorce and Separation]; Levinger, Marital Cohesiveness and Dissolution: An
Integrative Review, 27 J. Marriage & Fam. 19 (1965) [hereinafter Levinger, Marital
Cohesiveness]. An economic model of marital dissolution was developed by Gary Becker.
Becker, Landes & Michael, An Economic Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 1141
(1977) [hereinafter Becker, Marital Instability]; see also Becker, A Theory of Marriage, (pts. I
& II), 81 J. Pol. Econ. 813 (1973), 82 J. Pol. Econ. SlI (1974) (suggesting that persons decide
to marry when the expected utility of marriage exceeds that of remaining single); Huber &
Spitze, Considering Divorce: An Expansion of Becker's Theory of Marital Instability, 86 Am.
J. Soc. 75 (1980) (adding sociological variables to Becker's theory of marital instability and
measuring their impact on individual utility). Becker's model, although somewhat more
complex than the social psychology models, is consistent in its implications for
precommitment analysis.
100 See Levinger, A Social Psychological Perspective, supra note 99.
101 Levinger associates the intrinsic satisfactions of marriage with three types of rewards:
material rewards, which include economic incentives to stay married, such as family income

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 76:9

by barriers around the marriage and by the attraction of alternatives,

such as another relationship or potential benefits of the status of being
single for career or personal development. 10 2 Thus, a marriage that is
intrinsically satisfactory may be vulnerable if few barriers reinforce
the relationship or if alternative attractions are powerful. Alterna-

tively, a marriage with few intrinsic rewards may be relatively stable if
the barriers to exit are substantial or if the unmarried status has little
appeal. Under Levinger's model, barriers to leaving the marriage

include financial costs, social, moral, and community constraints, and
the costs to family relationships. 10 3 In making a decision about
divorce, the spouse compares the attractiveness of the marriage and
1°4
the barriers that surround it with alternative attractions.
and home ownership (Levinger notes that high income and home ownership are inversely
related to divorce, although high income-when it exceeds the needs of the family-may lead
to greater external involvements and higher divorce rates); symbolic rewards, which include
vocational and occupational status, social similarity and other measures of homogeneity; and
affectional rewards, which include companionship, esteem, and sexual enjoyment. Id. at 4450.
Thibaut and Kelley call the individual's baseline for satisfaction in a relationship the
"comparison level." A relationship is determined to be minimally satisfactory (or not) based
on the individual's past experience and observation of the relationships of others. If the
relationship is better than the standard, the person is likely to view it with some satisfaction. J.
Thibaut & H. Kelley, supra note 99, at 97-99. Thibaut and Kelley define the comparison level
as a "neutral point on a scale of satisfaction-dissatisfaction." Id. at 81. The compirison level
"indicates a point . . . where the mood changes from positive to negative and where the
orientation changes from toward the dyad to awayfrom it." Id. If satisfaction with outcomes
goes below the comparison level, a person is dissatisfied and unhappy with the relationship and
would leave the group if possible. Id. The individual's past experience is relevant because if
his relationships have been superior, the comparison level will be higher. Individuals will
differ in their comparison level depending on what their experience has led them to expect.
102 Levinger is drawing on a conception first developed by Thibaut and Kelley that they call
"comparison level for alternatives." Thibaut and Kelley suggest that a relationship that is not
intrinsically unsatisfactory may be unstable because an alternative is more attractive. J.
Thibaut & H. Kelley, supra note 99, at 21-24. They define the comparison level for
alternatives as "the lowest level of outcomes a member will accept in the light of available
alternative opportunities." Id. at 21. The alternative relationships that are compared to the
current one may include relationships with other individuals, groups, or even the
nonrelationship alternative of joining no group and working or being alone. The comparison
level for alternatives is the standard the group member uses in deciding whether to remain in
or'leave the relationship. Levinger adopts this notion. Levinger, A Social Psychological
Perspective, supra note 99, at 42-43.
103 Under Levinger's model, the importance of barriers is explicit. See infra note 104.
Under Thibaut and Kelley's model, exit costs (barriers) are implicit in the calculation of the
comparison level for alternatives. See supra note 102.
104 Levinger describes these costs, respectively, as material costs, (the financial expenses of
leaving the marriage including lost spousal income and economies of scale, alimony, and child
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Levinger suggests that barriers to divorce may have another effect.
The married person who tends to explore alternative relationships
may thereby increase the probability that divorce will, at some point,
seem more attractive than marriage.1 05 The extent to which alternatives are explored may depend on barriers to exit as well as on the
intrinsic attractiveness of the marriage. If substantial barriers to termination exist, married persons may not be likely to consider the decision to stay or leave the marriage unless the marriage is extremely
unrewarding. As barriers decrease, the continuation of the marriage
is dependent on sustained continuous satisfaction with the relationship relative to alternatives. The calculus becomes a more direct comparison between marriage and alternatives with less mitigation for
temporary fluctuation in preferences. As Berscheid and Campbell
have commented, the freedom to come and go has a price.
To have a perpetual choice means that one must choose-not once
but over and over again. And to do so one must continually expend
time and energy in evaluating and reevaluating the wisdom of the
choice.... 0 6
support), symbolic costs (including religious constraints, the sense of obligation to marriage
and family, and community pressure), and affectional costs (which include the loss of the
marriage relationship and impairment of relationships with children). Levinger, A Social
Psychological Perspective, supra note 99, at 51-55.
Levinger's evidence that there are costs to leaving the marriage associated with an obligation
to the marriage bond includes the following: higher divorce rate among marriages entered into
after a short acquaintance and the inverse relation between the divorce rate and the length of
the marriage. Id. at 52. The nature of the religious belief, the extent of religious practice, and
the effects of having the same or different affiliation are relevant to the effect of religious
constraints on divorce decisionmaking. Id. at 53. The effect of community pressure may be
reflected in the higher divorce rates in urban than in rural communities. Community pressure,
of course, will only be a barrier to divorce if the prevailing norms are not supportive of marital
breakup. Id. at 54. Interestingly, Levinger does not include legal barriers in the most recent
description of his model. An earlier version of the model of divorce decisionmaking included
the costs of legal barriers. See Levinger, Marital Cohesiveness, supra note 99, at 25.
105 Levinger argues that the relationships that each person in the marriage has with third
parties may compete with the marriage relationship; because external relationships demand
time and energy, they may draw affect away from the pair. Moreover, relationships with
possible partners contain the threat that the involved spouse will eventually prefer the
alternative. Levinger, A Social Psychological Perspective, supra note 99, at 42-43. In terms of
precommitment theory, exploration of alternatives may reflect choices based on short term
preferences, the kind of "precursor behavior" that may lead to a decision to divorce. See
Schelling, supra note 92.
106E. Berscheid & B. Campbell, The Justice Motive, in Times of Scarcity and Change 23-24
(M. Lerner & S. Lerner eds. 1981).

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 76:9

The social psychological research of Levinger and others supports
the intuition that precommitment mechanisms imposing burdens on
divorce could influence decisions about divorce. There is consensus
that the individual considering divorce usually undertakes a cost-benefit calculation, comparing continued marriage with divorce. 107 One
type of cost that makes divorce less attractive is the barrier to exit
from marriage. Precommitment mechanisms may function as barriers to exit and may thereby promote marital continuity and stability
both directly and indirectly.
D. Applying the Precommitment Perspective to Divorce and
MarriageDecisions
Precommitment mechanisms potentially promote marital stability
in both direct and indirect ways. First, and most obviously, precommitments may add directly to the cost of the decision to divorce. Second, these mechanisms may indirectly reduce the risk of marital
failure by influencing behavior during the marriage, promoting cooperation and reducing conflict. If they promote marital stability,
precommitments may reduce the likelihood that divorce will ever be
considered. In other words, by making divorce more difficult,
precommitments may change the way people think about and act in
marriage. Third, the use of precommitment mechanisms may discourage impulsive marriages and promote decisions about marriage
that reflect the long-term preferences of the individual.
1. Precommitment Strategies and the Decision to Divorce
Precommitment strategies directly increase the costs of choosing
divorce by raising the costs of leaving the marriage. Some precommitment devices may impose direct penalties on the decision to
divorce (such as promises to relinquish a substantial portion of
postdivorce income or property). Other costs may be measured in
terms of inconvenience, delay, and uncertainty (such as waiting periods, or mandatory counseling, psychological assessment, or arbitration). At the margin, the proposed precommitment plan may increase
the costs of exit enough to effect a decision to continue in the marriage
by one who might otherwise opt for divorce. Put another way,
107 This conclusion is also supported by Becker's model. See Becker, Marital Instability,
supra note 99, at 1142.
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precommitment represents a significant fixed cost that will always
weigh in favor of continuing marriage in any comparison of the marriage and its alternatives." °8
This does not mean that the party who decides against divorce
because of the costs imposed by precommitment is thereby imprisoned in an unhappy marriage. Precommitment is designed to pro-

mote, not to thwart, long-term personal fulfillment. Thus, strategies
that discourage divorce are meant to operate only as safeguards
against overvaluation of the alternatives or exaggeration of the costs
of marital dissatisfaction. If, as the theory predicts, short-term preferences bias the calculus toward divorce, these preferences will over
time weigh less heavily. If this happens, the long-term cost-benefit
calculus will once again support remaining in the marriage because of

its intrinsic benefits and not because leaving is made too costly by the
precommitment device. For example, the attraction of another relationship may temporarily weigh heavily in comparing the alternative
of divorce with continued marriage. The decisionmaker may opt to
remain married only because of the additional costs imposed on the

divorce decision by the precommitment. However, with the passage
of time, the other relationship may lose its attractiveness, and continued marriage may be preferred to divorce, independent of the costs
added by the precommitment.

108 A reader may ask at this point why the existing costs of leaving a marriage are not
adequate to thwart all but the most considered decisions to divorce, decisions that may reflect
the individual's long-term interests. Probably for many individuals who are unhappy in
marriage and are thinking about divorce, the economic and psychological costs may serve as a
deterrent to ill-considered actions. Cohen has described the relationship-specific investment in
marriage that, in part, explains why divorce is costly for many persons. Cohen, Marriage,
Divorce, and Quasi-Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life," 16 J. Legal Stud. 267,
267-68 (1987). However, two related factors function to distort the divorce decisionmaking
process and may result in an undervaluation of the costs. First, cognitive biases and
fluctuating preferences may influence decisionmakers to make errors in valuing the costs and
benefits of divorce and of staying married. For example, an alternative relationship that may
be weighed heavily in the decision may diminish in value over time. Second, decisionmakers
may simply be unable to foresee the costs of divorce in terms of time, money, and
psychological stress. In part, this may result from the misleading signal transmitted by
modern divorce law which suggests that efficient disentanglement may be accomplished. A
lawyer-psychologist, who has worked with many divorcing clients, commented that he often
hears the lament, "If I had known that this was going to be so awful (difficult, expensive,
psychologically stressful) I never would have done it." Remarks of Charles Ewing, Professor
of Law, State University of New York-Buffalo, Law-Psychology Colloquium (May 6, 1988).
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In terms of precommitment theory, an extensive waiting period
prior to divorce is a particularly appropriate strategy. A waiting
period ensures that divorce will occur only if the calculus remains in
favor of leaving the marriage. In a sense, a waiting period puts
precommitment theory to the test in each case. The theory predicts
that frequently the cost-benefit calculus will shift as individuals recognize their long-term interests in maintaining the marriage, and the
attraction of alternatives wanes. If, after a waiting period, the costbenefit calculus continues to favor divorce, then the choice may represent a change in the individual's long-term interests. In this case,
precommitment theory may not apply (because it assumes consistent
long-term interests), and divorce may be the appropriate outcome, at
least for the unhappy spouse.10 9

This raises a more general problem with the application of precommitment strategies to the divorce decision-a problem that will be
explored in more depth below. 110 If the assessment by the unhappy
spouse of the costs and benefits of remaining married or alternatively
of obtaining divorce accurately reflects long-term preferences that
have changed since the time of the marriage, then the costs imposed
by precommitment strategies may be the principal barrier to leaving
the marriage. 1 ' If this is so, then the individual's realization of longterm goals may be thwarted, perhaps indefinitely (depending on the
device). Although this result suggests a daunting problem, it may be
mitigated in some cases because barriers to exit from the marriage
created by precommitment devices may have a feedback effect on
behavior during marriage. This positive effect may make contemplation of divorce less likely to occur.
2. Precommitment Analysis and Behavior During Marriage
Individuals who enter marriage dedicated to its success may try to
cooperate and to avoid conduct that would lead to conflict, withdrawal, or dissolution of the relationship. Indeed, the generally
accepted norm for behavior in marriage is cooperative rather than
109For a more extensive discussion of mandatory delay, see infra notes 166-72 and

accompanying text.
110See infra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.

II Levinger describes the "empty shell" marriage as one that is without intrinsic attraction,
but continues only because of barriers that prevent exit. Levinger, A Social Psychological
Perspective, supra note 99, at 41-42.
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conflictual or competitive.11 2 The failure of many marriages suggests
that this norm is often not effective to prevent behavior that may
eventually lead to breakdown of the relationship. In this Section,

drawing on recent scholarship about long-term contractual relationships, I will speculate about why the informal cooperative norm
sometimes fails and analyze how legal precommitments may reinforce
this norm, thereby promoting marital stability.
Robert Scott has illuminated the relationship between social norms
and legal regulation in long-term contractual relationships.l"3 Scott's
analysis suggests that informal social norms are important in reinforcing cooperative patterns of interaction in ongoing business relationships. 4 Despite the intentions and efforts of the parties, however,
misunderstanding and mistrust may threaten the cooperative interaction. Moreover, informal norms are inadequate to deal with severe
defections that may trigger retaliation or simply destroy the relationship. Thus, legal enforcement of contractual provisions in business
cooperative norm in marriage may include such values and behavior as fidelity,
honesty, open communication, and concern for the spouse's preferences and welfare.
Arguably this is particularly true for families with children. For many parents, a stable
marriage is an optimal setting for rearing children.
113 Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 2005 (1987).
Scott describes experimental research in game theory which demonstrates that conditional
cooperation-"tit for tat"-is the best strategy to maintain a cooperative equilibrium in a longterm strategic game relationship. See R. Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 30-33 (1984);
A. Rapoport & A. Chammah, Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation 65-66
(1965); Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 24 J. Conflict Resolution 3, 7-9
(1980); Downing, The Prisoner's Dilemma Game as a Problem-Solving Phenomenon: An
Outcome Maximization Interpretation, 6 Simulation & Games 366, 382-85 (1975).
The player who wishes to maximize his individual interests should begin with a cooperative
stance and defect only if the other player defects and then, after a single retaliation, return to
the cooperative pattern. This pattern, once established, is likely to lead to equilibrium. Scott
uses this experimental research to develop a game-theoretic model that may be applied to
decisionmaking to distribute risk in real world long-term contractual relationships. See Scott,
supra, at 2009-30.
114 See Scott, supra note 113, at 2030-34. Parties in long-term contracts may use extralegal
signals to convey their cooperative intentions and to discourage defection by the other party.
A reputation for cooperation is one method for signaling cooperative intentions. This social
norm of reciprocity is important in contractual interactions as are honesty, promise-keeping,
and trust. Id. at 2040-42. Legal scholars and sociologists have studied the role of cooperation
in informal norms as social control mechanisms. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and
Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. Legal Stud. 67 (1987); MacCaulay, NonContractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963) (study of
Wisconsin businessmen suggesting that importance of honoring commitments went beyond
legal enforcement threat).
112 The
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settings serves the important role of providing a remedy to the nonbreaching party and also as the ultimate deterrent to noncooperative
behavior. Knowledge that the defection will be sanctioned reduces
the temptation
to defect and reinforces cooperative patterns of
1 15
behavior.
The similarities between marriage and commercial contractual relationships should not be exaggerated. However, some insights may be
drawn from Scott's analysis about the potential importance of
precommitments as mechanisms to reinforce cooperation during marriage. Modern marriage is analogous to a long-term contractual relationship without legal enforcement. Although most spouses probably
adopt a cooperative norm of marital behavior, the temptation to
"defect" from this norm may be substantial, given the stresses of marriage and the broad range of interactions involved. Defection leading
to divorce might occur in at least two ways. First, a retaliatory pattern of noncooperation may emerge that eventually erodes the
unreinforced commitment to cooperation in marriage. With no
mechanism for altering the pattern, the couple drift toward divorce,
which is always an option.' 16 Second, a massive defection, such as an
extramarital relationship, may so damage the relationship that reestablishment of a cooperative pattern becomes impossible.
Social norms supporting cooperation in marriage encourage
couples to renew their cooperative efforts after periods of conflict and
to seek to avoid defection or destructive patterns of retaliation. For
several reasons, however, unreinforced informal norms alone may be
ineffective to sustain long-term cooperation (just as they may be in a
contractual relationship). First, in the marital context, the cooperative norm has weakened somewhat; indeed it may conflict with other
11s See Scott, supra note 113, at 2042-49.
Scott emphasizes the importance of legal
enforcement to provide a threat of retaliation to discourage deviations from the cooperative

pattern. Id. at 2044.
116 Schelling has observed the usefulness of precommitments in avoiding precursor
behavior. See supra notes 91-92. It seems probable that many people who ultimately become
dissatisfied with their marriages embark on a course of behavior that leads to divorce without
intending that result. For example, marital breakdown that is associated with an extramarital
affair by one party may begin with flirtatious behavior that is not intended to imperil the
marriage.
Levinger describes the relationship among low barriers to exit from marriage, exploration of
alternatives, and marital instability. See Levinger, A Social Psychological Perspective, supra
note 99, at 55-58.
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values in marriage, such as enhanced personal freedom. Cooperation
may require accommodation to the spouse and sublimation of preferences, responses that may seem to conflict with some conceptions of
self-fulfillment. Moreover, the fact that divorce is always an option
may contribute to the erosion of cooperative intentions. The temptation to engage in behavior that seriously threatens the relationship (a
massive defection) or to continue a destructive pattern of retaliation
may be more compelling if the damaged relationship can be left
behind. Further, because it can always be ended, the marriage relationship is intrinsically insecure; therefore, the risk of misinterpretation and mistrust may be great. Uncooperative acts by one spouse
may now be interpreted by the other as evidence of withdrawal from
the relationship, thereby triggering responsive patterns of retaliation
or withdrawal that weaken the unreinforced commitment to
marriage.
In contrast, legally enforced precommitments creating barriers to
divorce may reinforce cooperative intentions for marriage, reducing
the temptation to defect. The knowledge that because of precommitment, leaving the marriage will be costly may, at least indirectly,
influence marital partners to resist the temptation to engage in behavior that would threaten the relationship (an affair, for example). Like
a party to a long-term contractual relationship, the married partner
may be dissuaded from defection by the prospect of legal enforcement
of the commitment.
At an intangible level, precommitments burdening divorce may
influence day-to-day choices and behavior in marriage, shaping the
attitudes of the spouses about the kind of relationship they have
undertaken. Such a conception of marriage might be expressed as follows: "We have made a commitment to this marriage, and we are not
getting out of it easily. Since we are here for the duration, we may as
well make the best of it." A quite different frame of mind may be
anticipated in the midst of the stresses of marriage if divorce is always
an option. In a marriage bounded by precommitment, the original
cooperative intentions may be less likely to be forgotten, because the
relationship cannot be readily abandoned if it becomes unsatisfac-
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tory. 117 This may influence parties to protect the marriage by avoiding behavior that may lead them to confront the costly decision to
divorce. 118 In this way, legally enforceable precommitments
powerfully reinforce the informal cooperative norm in much the same
way that the threat of legal enforcement reinforces cooperative norms
in long-term contractual relationships.
3.

Precommitment Analysis and the Decision to Marry

Individuals who contemplate marriage today have an option that
was unavailable in earlier times to enjoy many of the benefits of the
relationship without changing their legal status. Certainly, unmarried
couples live together for long periods without significant social stigma
in many cultural settings.' 19 Thus, it is likely that most persons entering marriage see themselves as making some commitment; otherwise
the purpose of marriage is unclear.12°
Currently, few legal constraints or formalities signal that marriage
is a decision that should be made thoughtfully. In virtually every
state, acquaintances of a few weeks may become legally married with-

117 An analogy is the New Year's resolution to stop smoking or to engage in some other
behavior change. Chances for success may be greater if precommitment mechanisms are used
to reinforce the result. See T. Schelling, supra note 87, at 57-82.
118 The common sense of this point is supported by a cross-cultural example. Dispute
resolution in some South Pacific island societies is achieved through a process of mediation.
Accommodation and restoration of harmony are the apparent normative goals rather than
"justice" or designation of a winner and loser. Confrontation and conflict are discouraged.
Researchers studying these societies have explained this pattern of conflict resolution as
derived from the nature of the community and the geographic constraints. Members of a
community on a small island must continue to live together after the resolution of the current
dispute. They have continuing multistranded relationships and must engage in interaction in
the future. It is, in short, a no-exit situation. Comments of Cliff O'Donnell, Professor of
Psychology, University of Hawaii, Study Group on Child Advocacy Research, Lincoln, Neb.
(June 27, 1988).
119 Probably largely because of changing sexual mores regarding premarital relationships,
the number of cohabitating unmarried couples has increased steadily over the past 30 years.
See generally Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried People in American Law,
30 Ariz. L. Rev. 207 (1988) (arguing that legal preferences for the institution of marriage
should be invalidated because they discriminate against various alternative lifestyles).
120 Anecdotal evidence suggests that many couples living together probably decide to get
married because they plan to have children. If this is so, it suggests that prospective parents
may associate the responsibility of having children with commitment and a goal of a stable,
relationship.
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out significant delay.'2 1 Moreover, divorce law may reinforce a view

of marriage as a relationship embraced and discarded with ease. A
legal policy favoring precommitment by reinforcing a conception of
marriage as a lasting relationship may influence the attitudes of persons considering this step.
The analysis thus far presumes that the decision to marry typically
represents the reflective consideration by the individual of her long-

term interests. The use of precommitment increases the likelihood
that this will be so, promoting decisions that represent a thoughtful
choice to bind oneself to a long-term relationship. To take an extreme
example, a person contemplating marriage might consider the deci-

sion more seriously if divorce were unavailable than if it were readily
obtainable. Because of the heavy cost of error, there would be fewer

marriages altogether and far fewer among persons whose acquaintance is brief. Those couples who do not want to bind themselves
may
22
era.1
earlier
an
of
opprobrium
social
the
without
together
live
An obvious objection occurs: If a policy encouraging precommitment discourages from marriage some couples who will later have
children, then their children may be harmed. It is plausible to
assume, however, that plans to have children will influence parties to
choose commitment and marriage. Further, research on teenage marriage offers little support for the notion that promoting unstable marriages between persons who are immature, uninformed, and not ready
23
to make a commitment ultimately promotes the welfare of children.
121See supra note 12. Historically, social and religious traditions such as betrothal and the
posting of banns may have encouraged more thoughtful decisions about marriages. Today
these traditions have eroded, but so also have the strong social norms favoring marriage for
couples living together.
122There is a trend toward imposing financial exit costs on long-term nonmarital
relationships in the form of "palimony" or property settlement. Such awards are ordered on
an implied contract theory. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815 (1976) (describing trend toward couples living together without marriage; court
permitted enforcement of expectations of nomnarried couple regarding support and property
based on express or implied contract upon separation).
123Furstenberg studied over 400 adolescent mothers who were pregnant at the time of
marriage. Furstenberg, Premarital Pregnancy and Marital Instability, in Divorce and
Separation, supra note 99, at 83, 88. He found that three out of five of these marriages ended
in divorce within six years. The findings of this study support two hypotheses explaining the
amount of marital instability when a premarital pregnancy is involved. Furstenberg's study
suggests that premarital pregnancy disrupts the courtship process and cuts short the stage of
preparation for marriage. Couples who had a longstanding relationship prior to the pregnancy
were less likely to divorce. Economic factors also contributed to marital instability in these
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Nonetheless, the possibility that precommitment may impose costs on

some children by discouraging marriage is a normative concern that
can not be readily resolved. 124
E. The Limits of the Precommitment Model for Marriageand
Divorce Decisionmaking

To this point the analysis has assumed that decisions about marriage and divorce conform to precommitment theory. That is, the
decision to marry reflects considered long-term preferences while
short-term interests influence decisions to divorce. In this Section I
explicitly relax these assumptions and acknowledge that some marriage and divorce decisions may not conform to the precommitment
model. 125 First, some marriage decisions will be impulsive, immature,
or poorly informed and thus will not involve the careful consideration
of long-term preferences that the analysis predicts. Second, contrary
to the assumption thus far, some people decide to divorce because
their values and goals have changed so greatly that remaining in the

marriage no longer reflects long-term interest or preferences.
cases. Many of the fathers were required to quit school and enter the labor force in menial
positions. Their earning capacity was thus impaired. Id. at 84-86. Adolescent parents
experience additional stresses that may contribute to marital instability. Their level of
educational achievement is generally lower than that of their peers; they have fewer
employment opportunities and are generally relegated to low-paying jobs. Their children often
have more health problems in infancy and exhibit cognitive deficits compared to other
children, deficits that may be linked to the educational and economic situation of their parents.
See studies cited in Scott, Adolescents' Reproductive Rights: Abortion, Contraception, and
Sterilization, in Children, Mental Health, and the Law 125, 137-39 (1983). A substantial body
of social science research has examined the relationship between premarital pregnancy and
later divorce. The general finding is that premarital pregnancy greatly increases the
probability of eventual divorce. Christensen found that marriages that involved a premarital
pregnancy were more than twice as likely as marriages that involved a postmarital pregnancy
to end in divorce within the first five years of marriage. See Christensen, Cultural Relativism
and Premarital Sex Norms, 25 Am. Soc. Rev. 31, 37 (1960); Christensen, Timing of First
Pregnancy as a Factor in Divorce: A Cross-Cultural Analysis, 10 Eugenics Q. 119, 124 (1963).
Coombs and Zumeta found that 10.3% of couples who conceived premaritally were divorced
after five years compared to 3.5% who did not have a premarital pregnancy. Coombs &
Zumeta, Correlates of Marital Dissolution in a Prospective Fertility Study: A Research Note,
18 Soc. Probs. 92, 97-98 (1970).
124For further discussion, see infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
125 Fortunately, in many cases the marriage decision may conform to other generally held
life goals and values that may influence and reinforce the choice. Similarity in religious
practice, values, and socioeconomic status is associated with marital stability; most people tend
to find a marital partner who is similar to themselves in these regards. See Becker, supra note
99, at 827; Bumpass & Sweet, supra note 81, at 760-65.
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Another factor that complicates the functioning of the precommitment model, but in two conflicting directions, is that predictable cog-

nitive biases distort the individual's ability to make rational choices
about marriage and divorce. 126 The usefulness of precommitments is
reduced if decisions about marriage often reflect cognitive error.
However, the influence of cognitive biases on the decision to divorce

suggests the benefit of precommitment mechanisms, which may promote more careful decisionmaking in this context.

L

Suboptimal DecisionsAbout Marriage

If the decision to marry does not reflect careful consideration, then
precommitment strategies may bind the individual to an impulsive or
mistaken choice. An erroneous decision to marry could occur in several ways. The couple may marry after a short acquaintance and thus
know too little about each other. 127 More rarely, one party may
intentionally deceive the other about material facts relevant to the
decision to marry.1 28 Alternatively, circumstances may make further
search (for a suitable spouse) unduly costly, leading one or both parties to "settle" prematurely for a suboptimal mate. 12 9 Finally, one or
both persons may be too immature to make sound judgments about
their long-term interests and may calculate erroneously.1 30 If, in each
126 It is also probable that cognitive biases distort decisionmaking at the time of divorce.
See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
127 Furstenberg's study of marriages involving a premarital pregnancy found that a shorter
period of acquaintance before marriage correlated with a higher probability of divorce.
Furstenberg, supra note 123, at 90-92. The importance of the courtship period is emphasized
in marriage textbooks. E. Burgess & P. Wallin, Engagement and Marriage 159-69 (1953).
Brief acquaintance before marriage is correlated with higher marital instability. Burchinal,
Research on Young Marriage: Implications for Family Life Education, 9 Fam. Life
Coordinator 6, 16 (1960).
128 Fraud is a ground for annulment in 30 states and the District of Columbia. See statutes
cited in H. Clark, supra note 26, at 105. In others, it is included among fault divorce grounds.
Id. at 105-06.
129 Becker analyzes decisions to marry in terms of search costs. An individual may accept a
less than optimal mate if the value of additional search is offset by additional search costs.
This may occur because of a premarital pregnancy, or because the individual has unusual
traits, and the pool of appropriate partners with matching traits is small. Becker, Marital
Instability, supra note 99, at 1147-51.
130 See supra notes 81-82. Decision error by young individuals may result because they are
less capable of calculating their long-term interests or because their long-term interests, based
on values and goals, are not clearly defined and are thus incalculable. The research evidence is
consistent and compelling that those who marry at a young age are more likely to divorce.
Becker analyzes this finding in terms of search costs. Those who have high search costs are
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of these situations, precommitment strategies bind the person to an
impulsive, uninformed choice which turns out to be inconsistent with
long-term goals, then these goals may be temporarily undermined.
The cost of precommitment in these circumstances may be mitigated if,
as I have argued, precommitment mechanisms themselves
discourage impulsive marriage. The invitation to undertake a legally
binding commitment may have a sobering effect that makes the marriage choice less attractive. Specific devices, such as a mandatory
waiting period before marriage, may themselves promote more careful
decisions. Further, the stabilizing effect of precommitment mechanisms may help some marriages to endure and thrive despite the
suboptimal start. It is likely, however, that in some instances the mistake will not be discovered for some time after the marriage and will
not be overcome. Romantically distorted perceptions may dissolve
slowly and information that clarifies that the marriage decision was
erroneous may come to light only over time. Thus, legally enforceable precommitments may indeed impose costs on some individuals
bound to impulsive marriage decisions. 31
2. Precommitment and the Problem of "'LaterSelves"
Even a marriage that was entered after careful consideration may
later fail to offer personal fulfillment. Based on all information available at the time of the marriage, a commitment to a future with the
partner may have been a thoughtful, reflective choice. Ten years
later, the couple may no longer share the same values, plans, and
interests that supported the earlier commitment. In some real sense
they may be "different" persons from the couple that married. One or
both partners may have grown and changed so significantly that continuation in the marriage may represent self-denial. Under the traditional view of marriage, failure of compatible goals and interests left
the marriage supported only by the sense of moral and religious
more likely to marry suboptimally at a young age and thus are more likely to dissolve their

marriages. He also suggests that marriage at a young age is more likely to occur if the
individual is pessimistic about potential options. Becker, Marital Instability, supra note 99, at
1151. This comports with the traditional explanation for some youthful marriages-the desire
of the young girl to escape from an unhappy family.
131A legal response directed at reducing the likelihood of impulsive marriage decisions may

be desirable. Some possibilities for achieving this goal are discussed in Part III, infra notes
170-73 and accompanying text.
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duty-and by legal bars to divorce. Modem social and cultural

norms do not support such self-sacrifice. To the extent that precommitment strategies create bonds to marriage that impede the pursuit
of important life goals, these mechanisms may defeat their own purpose, with costly results.
The impact of change over time on the meaning of personal identity

has been the subject of a lively debate in moral philosophy in recent
years.132 Derek Parfit has offered a provocative analysis of this issue
that provides insight when applied to changing personal identity over
the course of a marriage.13 3 Parfit presents what he calls the "com-

plex view" of personal identity as one perspective on the effect of
change over time. 134 According to this view, an individual's identity
as a separate person over time is grounded in psychological connections such as memory, character traits, and plans. The extent to
which these connections exist between different parts of a person's life
varies and is a matter of degree; thus, the continuity of personal identity may be a matter of degree. If a person's character changes, memory fades, and intentions and goals shift significantly over time, then
the person is a "self" different today from the "self" that existed at an

earlier time. To take an extreme example, the person who experiences
a permanent amnesia has an identity
different from the one she had
1 35
before the amnesia occurred.
132 See Penelhum, Personal Identity, in 6 Encyclopedia of Philosophy 95 (P. Edwards ed.
1967) ("To reidentify someone is to say or imply that in spite of a lapse of time and the
changes it may have wrought, the person before us now is the same as the person we knew
before."). See generally S. Shoemaker, Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity 125-36 (1963)
(proposing that identity is the persistence of a person through time going beyond what can be
known by observation and memory); B. Williams, Problems of the Self 127-35 (1973)
(questioning the premises in S. Shoemaker, supra, while exploring the relationships between
psychological states of mind); Perry, Personal Identity, Memory, and the Problem of
Circularity, in Personal Identity 135 (J. Perry ed. 1975) (defending the "memory theory" of
personal identity).
133 See Parfit, Later Selves and Moral Principles, in Philosophy and Personal Relations 137
(A. Montefiore ed. 1973) [hereinafter Parfit, Later Selves]; Parfit, On the Importance of Self
Identity, 68 J. Phil. 683, 686-89 (1972). See generally D. Parfit, Reasons and Persons (1984)
(arguing that personal identity is less static than previously believed).
134 Parfit describes the "simple view" and the "complex view" of personal identity. The
simple view is an all-or-nothing conception; it presumes psychological continuity and
contemplates no "degrees" of personal identity over time. In contrast, the complex view
focuses on connectedness. Parfit, Later Selves, supra note 133, at 139-40.
135 Parfit draws on literary examples to demonstrate the familiarity of the idea that personal
identity may change over time.
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The complex view has implications for promises and commitment.
If the person binds himself to perform certain acts in the future, he

may be binding a different person without that person's agreement. If
psychological connections are very weak over time, a commitment
that seriously restricts one's own behavior in later life is no more supportable than a commitment that would bind a different individual
without that person's consent. 36 Carried to the extreme, this perspective may abrogate notions of personal autonomy and responsibility; the individual is not free to commit his later selves and is not
responsible for behavior of earlier selves.1 37 The conception of changing personal identity is a fragmenting and unsettling notion in ethical
discourse. Mitigating this response is Parfit's emphasis that wholly
separate selves are rare; what he is suggesting instead is degrees of
connectedness.
Although this conception of personal identity may have troublesome implications as a way of thinking about personhood or as a basis
for moral responsibility, it does suggest rather powerfully a life course
different from that presumed by the precommitment model. In some
Nadya had written in her letter: 'When you return. . .' But that was the whole horror:
that there would be no return .... A new unfamiliar person would walk in bearing the
name of her husband, and she would see that the man, her beloved, for whom she had
shut herself up to wait for fourteen years, no longer existed ....
Id. at 140-44 (quoting A. Solzhenitsyn, The First Circle 232 (1969)).
136Parfit describes a case that suggests the problems of precommitment theory. An
idealistic young nobleman signed a document that would automatically give away all of his
land at some future time, a promise that could only be revoked with his wife's consent. He
told his wife that she must never consent if he should at some later time ask her, because
I regard my ideals as essential to me. If I lose these ideals, I want you to think that I
cease to exist. I want you to regard your husband, then, not as me, the man who asks
you for this promise, but only as his later self. Promise me that you will not do what he
asks.
Id. at 145. Years later when the man's socialist ideals fade, he asks his wife to revoke the
document. Parfit explores the implications of the wife's earlier promise to her husband. Is her
obligation to her current husband or to the young man whom she married who has in some
sense ceased to exist? Id. at 145-46.
From the man's perspective this case suggests a problem with precommitment theory. The
idealistic young man attempted to bind himself (and his wife) to an outcome that was consistent with his deeply held values and with the "life plan" based on these values. These values
later changed. The husband's "later self" was bound by a commitment made by the earlier
self that conflicted with his current values and goals.
137For example, the psychological connections between the man charged with a crime
today and the criminal who committed the offense may be weak (perhaps because of a religious
conversion). In this situation, under the complex view the moral claims supporting criminal
responsibility are weaker than if psychological connections are strong.
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persons, dramatic changes in character and in life goals may occur
over the course of a marriage. A young couple may each change in
important ways as they mature. One person may pursue an educational or career path that departs from the family or social norm of
the couple. Religious conversion, wartime military experience, or an
encounter with serious illness may have a major impact on shaping
and changing personal identity. Perhaps more typically, the marriage
may join two young individuals with relatively unformed personal
identities. Each may grow to form a mature "self" who is very different from the earlier person.
A potential for error exists if precommitment mechanisms are used
by couples such as these. If the young person entering marriage
makes a commitment that restricts her freedom at a later time when
she wishes to get divorced, she may in at least a symbolic sense be
binding a "different" person with different values, character, and
long-term goals. That person may not, as the precommitment model
predicts, be pursuing short-term preferences in seeking the divorce.
Rather, the marital breakdown may reflect a change in long-term
preferences, and divorce may be necessary to the pursuit of her life
plan. If this is so, precommitments devised by the person at marriage
would impede rather than promote self-actualization, contrary to the
predicted outcome. Put another way, the decision to divorce represents the expression of the (later) individual's long-term interests over
time. In this situation, if the individual is bound by the earlier commitment, the enforcement cannot be based on the rationale that sup138
ports precommitment.
Precommitment mechanisms may not function correctly in cases in
which one or both marital partners experience significant changes in
personal identity over time. Indeed, to the extent that personal identity is an evolving rather than static construct, a broader challenge to
the precommitment model may be offered, because the model
presumes that long-term goals and interests are consistent over time.
Further, the determination of whether one or both spouses will experience significant personal change is probably impossible at the time
of marriage.
138 This is not to say that enforcement will always be unjustified. The reliance interest of
the spouse or harm to children may support enforcement in some cases despite the failure of
the precommitment rationale. See Part III infra.
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The analysis suggests, however, that the use of precommitments
itself may mitigate the problem of "later selves" and promote conformity to the model. Personal change that results in an intolerable
distance or incompatibility between spouses is arguably less likely to
occur in a marriage that is supported by enforceable commitments.
The later "self," in most instances, evolves slowly over time in
response to life experiences; the marital relationship itself may affect
that evolution. Cooperative behavior may promote change or growth
that results in compatible rather than alienated later selves.
The fact that, for some persons, long-term objectives may change
significantly suggests that very burdensome commitments may sometimes impose onerous costs. It does not argue against the use of
precommitment mechanisms in general. Indeed, some precommitments, such as mandatory delay, serve a valuable sorting function.
Under the current legal regime of quick divorce, the unhappy spouse
who wants to leave a marriage may be unable to assess accurately
whether this desire reflects short-term or long-term preferences.
After an extended period of delay, the spouse who is firm in the
resolve to divorce is likely acting on truly changed preferences.
3. Cognitive Biases in Decisionmaking
Cognitive error that tends to distort decisionmaking creates a further complication for the application of the precommitment theory to
marriage. Individuals are not perfectly rational decisionmakers, not
only because of impulsivity or fluctuating preferences, but also
because of systematic cognitive biases that predictably distort decisionmaking. Cognitive error may influence decisionmaking in both
the premarital and divorce contexts, with conflicting implications for
the use of precommitments. Because a person contemplating divorce
may overvalue that option in comparison with the alternative of
remaining married, precommitments burdening divorce may improve
decisionmaking in this setting. In the premarital context, however,
cognitive biases may result in an overly optimistic calculation of the
prospects of marital success, a response that raises questions about the
quality of decisionmaking about precommitment.
a. Cognitive Error in the PremaritalContext
Costs that may be incurred when the decision to marry does not
conform to the precommitment model may be exaggerated by predict-
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able cognitive error. Persons contemplating marriage are unlikely to
view the prospective partner objectively and may not measure the
potential costs and benefits of the marital state accurately. This
together with (and exaggerated by) impulsiveness and immaturity
may result in erroneous decisions to marry. Furthermore, a person
about to marry may have difficulty contemplating divorce and making
choices about that eventuality. Binding commitments made at the
time of marriage may be affected by romantic enthusiasm for the partner that discounts the possibility of marital failure.
A body of experimental and theoretical research in decision theory
suggests that the context in which decisions and judgments are made
may have an important effect on the outcome. Individuals use heuristics or rules of thumb to evaluate information and to make probability
assessments. For the most part, these mechanisms are a useful
method of simplifying complex choices, 139 but they may also result in
cognitive error.14° The type of cognitive error most likely to distort
139 There has been a substantial interest in the field of cognitive psychology in the way in
which individuals use heuristic principles to organize and simplify complex data in making
judgments and assessing the probability of uncertain events. Although they are useful tools,
heuristics lead to systematic error and inferential biases. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases 3 (D. Kahneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds. 1982) [hereinafter Judgment Under
Uncertainty].
140 Theoretical and empirical understanding of cognitive error has been derived from a vast
body of experimental laboratory research designed to systematically measure error at
performing certain intellectual tasks. Edwards and von Winterfeldt describe the elements of a
cognitive illusion (error):
1. A formal rule that specifies how to determine a correct (usually the correct) answer
to an intellectual question;
2. A judgment, made without the aid of physical tools, that answers the question; and
3. A systematic discrepancy between the correct answer and the judged answer.
Edwards & von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 225, 227 (1986). The findings of laboratory research testing subjective judgments of
individuals against a formally determined correct answer are, of course, not directly applicable
to decisionmaking about marriage and divorce. Nonetheless, the types of systematic error that
bias judgment, prediction, and inference in the laboratory setting also operate in judgmental
operations in a "natural" setting.
The modern research on cognitive error by Kahneman and Tversky and others developed
out of three separate lines of research in the 1950's and 1960's. The introduction of Bayesian
theory to psychological research by Edwards provided an optimal model of subjective
probability assessment under conditions of uncertainty. Much of the subsequent experimental
research has compared human judgments against the Bayesian paradigm. See Edwards,
Dynamic Decision Theory and Probabilistic Information Processing, 4 Hum. Factors 59
(1962); see also Edwards, Lindman & Savage, Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psychological
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premarital decisions is caused by the availability heuristic, which
leads the decisionmaker to overvalue vivid experiential data.1 4 1 The

choices of decisionmakers contemplating divorce in the premarital
context may also be distorted by cognitive dissonance, the discomfort
experienced in contemplating two logically inconsistent facts or
choices.

42

Research, 70 Psychological Rev. 193 (1963) (examining the implications of the Bayesian statistical model for psychological research). Another line of research compared statistical predictions with clinical performance. See P. Meehl, Clinical Versus Statistical Prediction: A
Theoretical Analysis and a Review of the Evidence (1954). A third body of research studied
human cognitive strategies for simplifying complex judgments. H. Simon, Models of Man:
Social and Rational (1957). Building on these three research lines, modem cognitive psychologists have focused on detecting and examining the use of judgmental heuristics and on the
development of descriptive theories that explain the use of heuristics in human reasoning. See
generally Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 139 (discussion of the experimental
research and descriptive theories about cognitive error); R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (1980) (building on Kahneman and
Tversky's descriptive theories of cognitive error); Abelson & Levi, Decision-Making and Decision Theory, in 1 The Handbook of Social Psychology 231 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d ed.
1985) (reviewing literature describing the decisionmaking process of individuals).
141 Another heuristic that may operate in the premarital setting is the anchoring effect.
Because of anchoring, decisionmakers fail to adjust estimates and predictions sufficiently to
accommodate subsequently gained information; as a consequence final estimates are
systematically biased to overvalue information acquired at the beginning of any calculation.
Two mind experiments demonstrate the anchoring effect. In one, subjects were asked to
estimate quantities, such as the percentage of African countries belonging to the United
Nations, and whether the percentage was higher or lower than a given number between 0 and
100. For those given a starting point of 10, the median estimate of percentage of African
countries was 25; with a starting point of 65, the median estimate was 45. In another
experiment, one group of subjects was asked to calculate 8 X 7 X 6 X 5 X 4 x 3 X 2 X 1 in
five seconds; a second group was asked to multiply 1 X 2 X 3 X 4 X 5 X 6 X 7 X 8. The
median estimate of the first group was 2250; for the second group the estimate was 512 (correct
answer is 40,320). Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 139, at 14-15.
Partly because of anchoring, persons thinking about marriage may tend to exaggerate the
positive qualities that attracted them to the prospective spouse and discount subsequently
gained negative information. This tendency will be more pronounced once the decision to
marry is made.
Anchoring may also lead people to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events and to
underestimate disjunctive events. Predictably, this leads to excessive optimism about the
success of plans and underestimation of the probable failure of complex systems. Tversky and
Kahneman describe how the anchoring effect may be observed in a plan, such as the
development of a product, that involves a series of events, each of which is likely to occur.
Planners will underestimate the possibility of failure, because the probability of success of the
conjunctive event (the whole project) is less than the probability of each component event. Id.
at 15-16.
142 The research on cognitive dissonance predated by more than two decades the
experimental studies and theoretical formulations defining the biasing effects of heuristics such
as availability and anchoring. Leon Festinger developed a theory of cognitive dissonance in
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The availability heuristic leads decisionmakers to weigh more heavily information that can readily be called to mind and particularly
information that is directly related to immediate experiences in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way. 143 In contrast, information that is
abstract or remote may be undervalued. Thus, in evaluating automobile performance, a person whose Toyota has been plagued with

mechanical difficulties may be influenced by this experience more
than by positive Consumer Reports assessments.

The availability heuristic may influence persons entering marriage
to underestimate the probability of marital breakdown. 144 The context
in which the decision to marry is made may promote a rose-colored
view of the partner and an optimistic assessment of the positive

aspects of marriage. Predictable problems that may undermine successful marriage (for example, economic hardship, career conflict, or
religious, age, social, or educational differences) may seem remote and
be undervalued in the decision.1 45 In the midst of this warm, emothe late 1950's, setting the research agenda in cognitive social psychology for more than a
decade. L. Festinger, Conflict, Decision, and Dissonance (1964); L. Festinger, A Theory of
Cognitive Dissonance (1957) [hereinafter L. Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance].
143 Availability relates, in part, to the retrievability of information. Information that is
familiar, vivid, or salient will be more readily retrieved than unfamiliar or abstract
information. See Borgida & Nisbett, The Differential Impact of Abstract vs. Concrete
Information on Decisions, 7 J. Applied Soc. Psychology 258 (1977); Nisbett, Borgida,
Crandall & Reed, Popular Induction: Information Is Not Necessarily Informative, in
Cognition and Social Behavior 113, 128-29 (J. Carroll & J. Payne eds. 1976). This type of
availability has been called vividness. Markus & Zajonc, The Cognitive Perspective in Social
Psychology, in I Handbook of Social Psychology 137, 181-82 (G. Lindzey & E. Aronson 3d
ed. 1985). Imaginability also plays a role in the assessing probabilities. For example, if the
risks of an upcoming expedition are dramatically portrayed, their likelihood will be
exaggerated. If certain risks are hard to imagine or do not come to mind, they may be
underestimated. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 139, at 12-13.
144 Of course, the influence on some persons entering marriage may be similar to that
predicted for people in general, i.e., overestimation of the probability of divorce. This may be
mere likely for persons whose own parents were divorced. These people may be less likely to
bind themselves to an idealistic precommitment.
145 Tversky and Kahneman describe another way in which the availability heuristic may
affect a prediction of the probability of divorce. An individual may attempt to construct
scenarios leading to divorce; she will then evaluate the plausibility of such scenarios and the
readiness with which they come to mind. Unlike predictions that are the subject of
experimental research, here the judgment cannot be measured against an objectively correct
answer. Tversky and Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 139, at 163.
This operation of constructing scenarios is the simulation heuristic, a variation of
availability. It may bias prediction in two ways in the premarital context. First, the
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tional climate, most persons are not likely to be thinking about

divorce at all. At most it6 is a remote possibility-something that hap14
pens to other couples.
Cognitive dissonance may intensify the possibility of distortion in
decisionmaking because the discounted, remote information is inconsistent with the vivid experiential data. Research on cognitive dissonance suggests that people have great difficulty contemplating two
logically inconsistent facts or events.147 If I know that I smoke three
packs of cigarettes a day and also know that this creates a substantial
risk of lung cancer, I am likely to distort one of these facts to reduce
cognitive dissonance (assuming that I value good health). I may persuade myself that I am cutting down on smoking, or I may decide
that the risk of lung cancer has been exaggerated. Researchers have
also found that after a choice is made, decisionmakers will exaggerate
the attractiveness of the choice and derogate alternatives.1 48 Because
of cognitive dissonance, individuals considering marriage may discount undesirable qualities about the prospective mate or other potential problems that marriage may bring. Furthermore, a person who
has decided to marry is likely to discount the possibility of his or her
own divorce because the two events are inconsistent. Persons about
implausibility of scenarios of future divorce may result in underestimation of the risk. Second,
the couple may contemplate their future as a "chain of plausible links" in a successful
marriage. Although the probability. of failure in a given link is not high, probability of failure
at some point is considerably higher. Kahneman & Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in
Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 139, at 201, 207-08.
146 This may suggest why antenuptial agreements are used so infrequently.
147 See supra note 142. Leon Festinger described cognitive dissonance as follows: "[Tiwo
elements are in a dissonant relation if, considering these two alone, the obverse of one element
would follow from the other." L. Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 142, at 13.
Markus and Zajonc offer the following propositions in a statement of cognitive dissonance
theory. Cognitive dissonance is a "noxious state" that the individual will attempt to reduce or
eliminate. It can be reduced or eliminated only by (a) adding new cognitions or (b) changing
existing ones. Adding new cognitions reduces dissonance if (a) they add weight to one side and
thus decrease the proportion of cognitive elements that are dissonant, or (b) the new cognitions
change the importance of the cognitive elements that are in dissonant relation with one
another. "Changing existing cognitions reduces dissonance if (a) their new content makes
them less contradictory with others or (b) their importance is reduced." Markus & Sajonc,
supra note 143, at 202.
148 Several researchers have studied postdecision effects. Once a decision is made,
individuals attempt to reduce dissonance by reevaluation of alternatives. The attractiveness of
the chosen alternative is increased and that of the rejected alternative decreased. Brehn,
Postdecision Changes in the Desirability of Alternatives, 52 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychology
384 (1956).
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to marry may conclude that those people who get divorced do not
approach marriage with the same commitment as they do.
If the decision to marry is separate from the decision to precom-

mit, 14 9 cognitive biases may influence the latter judgment in several

ways. For example, individuals may view the risk of divorce as
remote and hence reject precommitments as unnecessary to the success of their marriage. In nonmarital contexts, it is likely that persons
adopt precommitment strategies after experiencing substantial failure
to meet the desired goals.'
Most people entering marriage do not
have the memory of repeated failure. 15 1 Further, purposefully considering and planning for the possibility of divorce would invite the discomfort of cognitive dissonance, which people generally avoid.
However, some couples may view the adoption of precommitments as
an opportunity to affirm their confidence in the success of the marriage. The effect of availability might result in overly enthusiastic
precommitment based on optimism about the duration of the marriage. Indeed, "overcommitment" may result; that is, a greater
precommitment than an unbiased, rational decisionmaker seeking to
maximize her expected utility would make, based on all the information available to the soon-to-be-married person. The biased decisionmaker may bind herself to a marriage that a neutral observer
would predict has little chance for success.
Cognitive error affecting premarital decisions is costly if the nature
of marriage and divorce decisions varies from that presumed by the
precommitment model. However, if remaining in a marriage is in fact
consonant with the individual's long-term goals, then it matters little
that the initial commitment was not based on a realistic assessment of
the chances for success of the marriage. In the optimal case, there is
no such thing as overcommitment. Precommitments function to reinforce the individual's effort to attain marital success and do so in a
way that in itself contributes to the success. In other words, the use of
precommitment mechanisms increases the probability that the mar149 This will be true if people precommit contractually. If precommitment mechanisms are
implemented through mandatory legal rules, then the decision to marry is the decision to
precommit. See infra notes 198-204 and accompanying text.
150 For example, people are likely to develop precommitment strategies to assist them to
stop smoking or to lose weight after several unsuccessful efforts.
151 Some persons may, of course, have a memory of their own parents' failed marriages that
may encourage caution. This, of course, may promote careful decisionmaking or, at least,
reduce haste. Whether it would promote precommitment is unclear.
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riage decision will become what the individuals entering marriage
optimistically believe it to be.
b. Cognitive Error and the Decision to Divorce
Cognitive error may bias decisionmaking about divorce as well as
about marriage. The individual who seeks to escape an unsatisfying
marriage may not be a careful decisionmaker, accurately weighing the
costs and benefits of remaining married or getting divorced. The
availability heuristic may lead the decisionmaker to weigh heavily
current dissatisfaction in contrast to more positive aspects of the marriage, the partner, or the commitment to children. These latter considerations may seem remote and abstract in the context of thinking
about divorce."5 2 Optimism about the prospects for happiness with a
new partner may result in discounting the extent to which stresses
will confront that relationship. In effect, cognitive biases may in some
instances contribute to the mistaking of short-term for long-term preferences. Cognitive dissonance research predicts that individuals contemplating divorce will tend to avoid contemplating concurrently the
inconsistent course of continuing in the marriage. The possibility of
resolving marital problems may be discounted as the plan to divorce
develops.153 To resolve the dissonance between the two inconsistent
courses, individuals may be motivated to make a decision prematurely, at a time when temporarily intense short-term preferences may
be overvalued. Further, after making the decision there may be an
effort to reduce dissonance by discounting the attractiveness of the
rejected course of continued marriage. The more difficult the decision, the greater this postdecision effect. 54
In general, the accurate calculation of the costs and benefits of continued marriage versus divorce may be subverted by contextual biases
resulting in error. The analysis suggests that the distortion will not
generally or randomly affect the calculus but rather will tend systematically to reinforce the decision to leave the marriage. The upshot is
that cognitive error and dissonance, as well as fluctuating short-term
preferences, may lead to divorce decisions contrary to the individual's
long-term interest.
152 See supra notes 143-45. The vividness and salience of the contextual data may result in
their receiving undue weight.
153 See supra notes 147-48.
154 Brehm, supra note 148, at 384, 389.
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c. Cognitive Error and Precommitment Theory
Precommitment mechanisms may serve to improve decisionmaking
about divorce in two ways. By adding to the cost of divorce, precommitments make it more difficult to implement erroneous divorce decisions that reflect short-term preferences or predictable cognitive
biases. Moreover, some precommitment mechanisms, such as
mandatory delay, may also assist in reducing decision error by promoting careful decisions.
In the premarital context, the use of precommitments may compound the cost of error when individuals bind themselves to unworkable marriages. Today, this cost is mitigated by the fact that divorce
is readily available. We can correct our mistakes. If precommitments
make divorce more difficult, then the decision to marry becomes more
consequential, and distorted judgment about the prospects for a successful relationship is more costly. Only if the commitment influences
individuals making marriage decisions to calculate more carefully will
155
these costs be reduced.
It is true, of course, that the law has never required perfect information or rationality as a precondition to attaching juridical significance to an individual's exercise of choice. The fact that
decisionmakers make errors in prediction or make decisions based on
inadequate information is not grounds for releasing them from binding obligations. In this context, however, the argument for binding
obligation rests on key assumptions covering the nature of marriage
and divorce decisionmaking. Deviations from these assumptions suggest limitations in the applicability of the model.
F Summary
In an era in which legal, religious, and social barriers to divorce
have eroded, many couples find it very difficult to maintain the commitment with which they begin marriage. The analysis in this Part
has demonstrated that married persons could reinforce their aspirations for an enduring relationship through the use of precommitment
strategies. Binding commitments made at the time of marriage that
impose costs on the decision to divorce may promote conduct and
decisions in marriage that support the couple's express long-term
155Experimental research shows that error may be reduced through the use of tools; one of
the most useful tools is time. See infra note 169 and accompanying text.
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goals. Moreover, precommitments may intangibly shape attitudes
toward the marriage relationship in a way that promotes cooperative
behavior. By adopting precommitmeits, a couple may thus reduce
the risk of marital failure generally. They may also reduce the risk
that decisions to divorce will reflect predictable cognitive error or
fluctuating short-term preferences.
Unfortunately, precommitment mechanisms may not function well
in all cases. Some couples marry in haste or make decisions based on
inadequate information. Cognitive biases distort individual predictions about the probability of a successful relationship with the chosen
partner. Some people change greatly over time and no longer find
fulfillment in the marriage. In short, individuals may bind themselves
to mates who turn out to be incompatible, a costly decision in terms of
long-term self-fulfillment. Although, as I will demonstrate in Part
III, some of this error may be mitigated by corrective responses that
reduce biases and promote better decisionmaking about marriage and
divorce, there will be many "nonconforming" cases.
Nonetheless, precommitment mechanisms offer the intriguing
potential to assist many couples to achieve more successful marriages.
To be sure, the cost to personal freedom that precommitments would
impose on failed marriages argues against legally mandated restrictions on all divorces. Moreover, modem values would not support
such restrictions when only the interests of adults are at stake. The
societal interest in protecting children, however, together with the
widespread perception that divorce often sacrifices these interests,
argues for a policy of reinforcing the commitment to marriage of parents, even if some costs to personal freedom may result. Precommitment theory clarifies an opportunity to promote family stability that
in its essence is not repressive but a means to more effective fulfillment
of personal and societal goals.
III.

THE PRECOMMITMENT MODEL AND LEGAL POLICY

A. Introduction-FaultRevisited
In this Part, I explore how the precommitment perspective would
change the legal landscape of divorce. This task requires, first, a reexamination of the discredited fault regime and of the misguided nature
of the law's response to its failings. In one sense, the recent legal
reforms express modern cultural norms more accurately than did

traditional divorce law, both by recognizing the complexity of marital
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breakdown and by acknowledging the erosion of moral and religious
prescriptions for lifelong marriage. At the same time, however, the
definition of marriage and divorce offered by the no-fault regime distorts relationship values that continue to be important for many
people.
The discarded fault-based divorce law, although inadequate in
many ways, served a little noticed precommitment function that has
156
been inadvertently sacrificed in the effort to modernize legal norms.
Leaving a marriage was not easy under traditional law. It is plausible
that even as the religious and moral basis for lifelong marriage weakened, legal barriers may have continued subtly to reinforce personal
attitudes that marriage was a lasting relationship, attitudes that may
have promoted cooperative behavior. Moreover, the legal requirement of proving fault increased the costs calculated by the person
considering divorce. 15 7 Precommitment theory suggests that this may
have encouraged caution that ultimately served to benefit some individuals and families.158 The unhappy spouse could extricate herself,
but only with some difficulty. Thus, although many people evaded
the law's restrictions, it is plausible to assume that for others, the legal
barriers functioned to reinforce the marriage and to discourage
divorce. It is not surprising that the divorce rate has escalated dramatically as the barriers have fallen.
The traditional scheme failed, not because it erected barriers to
divorce, but because of the nature and scope of the barriers. The
scope of the legal restraints was both excessive and inadequate to
function effectively in contemporary society. The restrictions were
excessive because they impeded all divorces. In a society committed
to self-realization, substantial restrictions imposed by the state on
divorces involving only the interests of two adults may appear excessively paternalistic. The restrictions under traditional law were inade156 It is hard to find commentary supportive of the traditional scheme making divorce
contingent on spousal fault. An exception is Lawrence Stone, who has pointed out that the
fault divorce regime allowed the truly miserable person to escape from marriage while assuring
that she thought long and hard about the decision. See Stone, supra note 4, at 15.
157 Even avoiding the requirement of proving fault was costly. Consider, for example, the
pecuniary and nonpecuniary effects of securing an out-of-state divorce in Nevada.
158 The benefit would be realized in those cases in which divorce represented a fluctuating
short-term preference. Eventually the long-term preference of the unhappy spouse reasserted
itself, revealing the beneficial function of the legal barrier. Moreover, the restrictive legal
regime may have influenced behavior and attitudes in marriage.
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quate in scope in that many unhappy spouses could largely avoid their
impact by collusion between spouses, or by migratory divorce. The
limits imposed on divorce by the fault regime were also normatively
unsatisfactory, premised as they were on moralistic prescriptions for
lifelong marriage, to be set aside only for grave offense by one spouse
against the other. Finally, the fault grounds themselves offered a simplistic picture of marital breakdown that was inconsistent with contemporary understanding.
A modem scheme of legally sanctioned precommitments would
express commitment to marriage and family in a manner reflecting
contemporary goals and norms. The important societal interest in the
welfare of children would argue for a different use of precommitment
and a different legal response when divorces involve children than
when only the interests of adults are implicated. Thus, a permissive
policy of legal enforcement of antenuptial precommitment agreements
under general contract law principles may benefit those couples who
seek to achieve personal goals through reinforcement of their marriage relationship. A more interventionist legal stance is justified in
families with children. Precommitment theory supports a scheme of
mandatory rules designed to reinforce parental aspirations for family
stability. The law, by signaling to parents of minor children that
divorce is a weighty decision to be considered carefully, may reflect
social values that are obscured under current law. It may also reinforce and strengthen these values in a way that will influence the
evolution of modem cultural norms about marriage and family.
B. A Typology of Precommitment Mechanisms
One lesson of the failed fault regime is that the nature of the restriction that burdens divorce may affect both its social acceptability and
its effectiveness as a precommitment mechanism. In order to evaluate
the efficacy of various precommitments in contractual and mandatory
regimes, I begin by developing a typology of precommitment mechanisms. The first category includes those strategies that function
directly as precommitment mechanisms, imposing costs on divorce
and thus indirectly reinforcing marital continuity. The second category includes provisions that may serve this function but also
encourage more careful decisionmaking. Those "indirect" mechanisms either encourage decisions to marry that better reflect longterm preferences or discourage decisions to divorce that do not.
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Direct Precommitment Strategies

a. Economic Sanctions
In theory, the simplest precommitment device is a direct economic
cost (agreed upon in advance) imposed on the person who decides to
leave the marriage. In weighing the costs and benefits of divorce, the

dissatisfied spouse must consider the additional monetary costs
imposed by the precommitment and may therefore be deterred from
that decision. Economic sanctions include provisions for a stipulated
level of child or spousal support, a designated division of property, or
a direct fine, to benefit the children or the spouse who wants to continue in the marriage.
A family property trust also functions as a precommitment device.
Divorce will be less attractive if property of the marriage is not
divided upon divorce between the parties, but rather held in trust to
be used if needed for the support of minor children.15 9 Moreover, the

children will receive enhanced economic protection because parents
could not so easily move on to new relationships and new family
responsibilities after divorce.
Economic penalties may be effective precommitment devices, but
their use is likely to be controversial. First, their usefulness will often
be linked to family income and to the predictability of family economic status.160 Also troublesome is that events not anticipated at the
159See supra note 79. Courts and legislatures in a few states have begun to move in this
direction with provisions that the custodial parent should be awarded the family home. Until
recently, courts routinely ordered the sale of the home so that proceeds could be divided and
an efficient property settlement facilitated to allow each party to continue with life
unencumbered with entanglements of the marriage. Today, some courts allocate other
property so as to compensate the noncustodial parent, or if this is not feasible, defer the sale of
the home; the deferral of settlement is typically limited to two or three years, reflecting the
continued influence of the efficient settlement norm. Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20,
410 A.2d 1052, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 807 (1980) (examining constitutionality of
Maryland law); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. § 8-206 to -210 (1984) (providing for order pedente
lite allowing one spouse to occupy and possess the family home in order to maintain a
residence for the children for up to three years after divorce is granted); see supra notes 23-29
and accompanying text.
160 For example, a premarital agreement may require a defaulting spouse to pay the other
S200,000. This amount may prove to be uncollectible because the defaulting spouse has
inadequate resources, or it may be an inadequate deterrent if the family has acquired great
wealth at the time divorce is contemplated. To use another example, the designation of a
family property trust is likely to mean little for families with few assets. In general, economic
sanctions are probably most useful for middle and upper class couples. It is, of course, possible
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time of marriage may result in unfairness if precommitments are

enforced. 161 Further, economic penalties may have the paradoxical
effect of facilitating divorce by making it more attractive to the
"injured" spouse. Finally, some contractually agreed upon penalties
may have no place in divorces involving minor children. Enforcement against the custodial parent may threaten children's welfare,
and one-sided enforcement against noncustodial parents would be
unfair (and create distorted incentives to seek custody).
Some economic sanctions, however, particularly those that benefit
children-such as provisions for rigorous enforcement of substantial
child support or the encumbrance of property for the benefit of chil-

dren-may have broad applicability and are appropriately the subject
of mandatory legal rules. There is persuasive evidence that custodial
mothers and children are economically disadvantaged as compared to
fathers after divorce. Thus, in all but truly poor families, mechanisms
that more effectively protect children's claims to parental income and
property are useful as precommitments.
b. Nonpecuniary Precommitments

There are a variety of nonpecuniary precommitments that restrict
divorce by discouraging unilateral termination of the marriage and

requiring "best efforts" to save the relationship. 162 For example, a
to accommodate variations in income by describing economic penalties as a percentage of
income or by using sliding scales.
161 A couple may agree before marriage to a sizeable economic penalty for defection, each
party presuming that both will be employed. Later, one may decide to stay at home to care for
the couple's children. Because of this decision, she may be disproportionately burdened by an
economic penalty, should she decide to leave the marriage. This inequity may be mitigated
somewhat under modem equitable distribution statutes. Property distribution upon divorce
will include all property obtained during the marriage, including the value of a nonworking
spouse's interest in a business or profession. See N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236, at 132
(McKinney 1986). The homemaker spouse may also receive compensation for homemaker
services and for training or education expenses needed to prepare her for employment.
Nonetheless, to the extent that the two parties have disparate earning capacities, homemakers
will be disadvantaged by economic penalties. This problem may be less pronounced if the
possibility that one party may fill a caretaker role is anticipated and the precommitment is
fashioned to accommodate this circumstance. Thus, either standard-form contracts, see infra
notes 195-97 and accompanying text, or mandatory rules, see infra notes 198-204 and
accompanying text, may avoid the problems of unfettered private ordering about economic
penalties, see infra notes 181-94 and accompanying text.
162 Unilateral divorce disadvantages the spouse who wants the marriage to continue. She
cannot insist on performance of the marriage contract and thus lacks any bargaining
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provision that couples engage in marriage counseling, arbitration, or
mediation of disputes increases costs of divorce and indirectly supports marital continuity. Beyond its therapeutic value, counseling
serves the dual function
of increasing exit costs and promoting more
163
careful decisions.
A provision for mental health evaluation of children as a precondition to obtaining divorce requires the divorcing parents to calculate
the effects of divorce on their minor children. 16 Additional delay
before divorce or mental health counseling for the child might be the
agreed upon or required outcome if these steps were deemed beneficial
to children.1 65 Insufficient attention is directed toward the impact of
advantage that would result from a requirement of consent to divorce. Bargaining leverage is
conferred on the disappointed spouse if divorce without consent is more costly (in
nonpecuniary terms) than divorce by agreement.
163Although "involuntary" counseling may be of limited effectiveness, the prospect may be
weighed ex ante by the decisionmaker as a cost of divorce. Some states authorize courts to
order couples to participate in mediation of custody disputes. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 4607
(West 1983). Many observers believe that resolving custody disputes through mediation
promotes cooperation between divorcing parents about their children's future. Researchers
have found that even couples who were ordered to participate in mediation often reached
agreement about their children's custody. See Emery & Wyer, Divorce Mediation, 42 Am.
Psychologist 472, 474, 477 (1987). Thus, counseling and mediation may serve two functions.
First, they create additional steps that must be undertaken before divorce and thus add costs to
the decision. Second, they may encourage care in the decision and focus on the interests of
children.
164Mental health evaluation may offer information relevant to the child's current
functioning and potential negative effects of divorce, given the child's psychological
functioning and developmental stage. This information might be weighed by a party to the
divorce decision and could also provide a basis for recommended therapeutic intervention.
165The most extreme response would be a commitment barring (or indefinitely postponing)
divorce when it is contrary to the child's interest. Such a device would enhance the
uncertainty about whether divorce would be permitted when sought. Game theory suggests
that uncertainty about the termination point of the relationship in a prisoner's dilemma game
may promote cooperation. The person who knows that steps a, b, and c are necessary for
divorce may conform his behavior to these requirements and have less incentive to cooperate
in the marriage. Uncertainty about the outcome may discourage a purposeful move toward
divorce and encourage investment in the marriage.
To be sure, there are potential drawbacks to requiring the dissatisfied spouse to focus on the
impact of divorce on minor children. Some observers would argue that mental health
professionals lack the expertise to make such assessments and predictions. See Melton,
Shrinking the Power of the Expert's Word, Fam. Advoc., Summer 1986, at 22 (arguing that
mental health professionals should limit themselves to describing and investigating family
dynamics to give the courts a better "picture" on which to base their judgment). Moreover, to
condition divorce on a psychologist's opinion that it would be in the child's best interest may
create incentives for the divorcing parent to make the relationship so intolerable that divorce
may be the better alternative for the child. Furthermore, the indeterminacy of the best interest
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divorce on children in the calculus of some parents unhappy with
their marriage. The mandate to confront directly and formally this
issue signals its importance and imposes psychic costs on the divorce
decision even if no additional consequences hinge on the evaluation.
2. Provisions That Improve Decisionmaking

a.

Waiting PeriodsBefore Divorce

An extensive period of delay 166 before final divorce is the optimal
precommitment mechanism, serving three precommitment functions.
First, a waiting period creates a barrier to divorce that makes leaving
the marriage more costly. Second, to the extent that the costs and

benefits of the marriage and of alternatives to marriage may fluctuate
in value, an extended waiting period permits more accurate assessment of preferences over time and promotes decisions reflecting longterm interests. 167 Indeed, mandatory delay sorts out cases in which

the desire to divorce reflects a transitory intense preference from those
of the child standard may undermine its value in influencing divorce decisions. See Elster,
Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1987)
(attacking "best interest of the child" standard as too indeterminate to be helpful).
Indeterminacy in this context may offer some benefits however. In another context, Meir DanCohen has argued that indeterminacy in the definition of certain criminal defenses (such as
duress) may reduce the ability of offenders purposely to conform their behavior to the
requirements of the defense. Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 632-34 (1984). In sum, the case is strong
against a mandatory legal rule requiring that divorce be postponed if contrary to the child's
interest, but less persuasive against a voluntary precommitment or a required psychological
evaluation to advise the parties about the child's needs and potential adjustment problems.
166Although in some sense any time period is arbitrary, a delay of at least two years has
much to recommend it. Such a period effectively serves all the precommitment purposes
described in this section, i.e., it adds a substantial cost to the divorce decision, promotes the
likelihood that the decision reflects long-term interests and may reduce biases that distort
decisionmaking. Moreover, a two-year waiting period before divorce is supported by the
psychological literature on divorce. Most spouses, whether they seek the divorce or not, go
through a period of psychological separation and recovery from the broken marriage.
Psychologists estimate this period of serious stress and disruption lasts two years.
Hetherington, Effects of Divorce, supra note 64, at 285. Thus, it is probable that a precipitous
subsequent marriage would begin on an unstable foundation. Indeed, many divorced persons
remarry quickly and second marriages end in divorce at a substantially higher rate than first
marriages, in part perhaps for this reason. Glick, supra note 5, at 25. The interests of children
may be directly promoted by an extensive waiting period. Delay of remarriage will also delay
claims upon parents' financial and emotional resources by children of a second marriage. See
supra note 77 and accompanying text.
167For example, the importance of an extramarital relationship (or a mid-life crisis) may
seem overriding at one point in time, but its significance may diminish if substantial time
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in which long-term preference has truly changed.16 Thus, it is an
effective response to the troublesome problem of true changed preferences, or "later selves." Finally, a waiting period serves an independently useful function of reducing cognitive error in the decision
process. In experimental research, observers have found that cognitive error is reduced if decisionmakers have "tools" to assist them in
making judgments. One of the most useful tools is time.1 69 Contextual error created by availability may dissipate if individuals are given
more time to make their choices.
Mandatory delay before divorce will impose costs in some cases. If
the marriage is "dead" before the waiting period begins (and divorce
represents long-term preferences), then delay interferes with individual fulfillment through pursuit of other relationships. Moreover, for
some persons the continued uncertainty of the waiting period may
have costly psychological effects and will only postpone and extend
the period of dislocation. Finally, the period of delay could potentially impose economic costs on a dependent spouse if economic settlement is linked to the actual divorce. These economic burdens
could be ameliorated, however, by legal mechanisms providing for
support and protection of assets at separation.
Overall, despite some ill effects, mandatory delay before divorce
remains the most promising mechanism both to encourage marital
continuity and to promote more thoughtful decisions by persons contemplating divorce. Indeed, it is probable that many persons evaluating precommitments prospectively would conclude that the cost of
delay if the marriage fails is significantly outweighed by the potential
benefits if the precommitment promotes marital stability. It is also a
restriction that reflects contemporary values and avoids the inadequapasses before a divorce is obtained. If this does not happen, precommitment theory offers no
basis for barring divorce.
168 Research reveals that a substantial percentage of people who petition for divorce do not
follow through to obtain a divorce decree. Presumably, some of these are cases of changed
preferences.
169 Edwards, Remarks Delivered at Symposium on Legal Implications of Cognitive Error,
University of Southern California School of Law (Feb. 1985). Common sense suggests that
error and impulsiveness will be reduced and better decisions made with increased time to
weigh alternatives and carefully consider the decision. This belief supports "cooling off"
periods afforded purchasers from door-to-door salesmen under Home Solicitation Sales Acts.
See, e.g., Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2454 (1984); see Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in Door-toDoor Sales, 15 UCLA L. Rev. 717, 734-35 (1968).
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cies of fault grounds. Waiting periods do not connote blame for the
failure of the marriage, but merely encourage caution in the divorce
decision. Moreover, mandatory periods of delay could be designed to

be less vulnerable to collusion and other manipulation than were fault
grounds.
b.

Mandatory Delay Before Marriage

A waiting period before marriage 170 does not function directly as a
precommitment mechanism. It does, however, promote more
thoughtful marriage decisions and ameliorate the cognitive biases that
distort decisionmaking in this context. Impulsive marriage decisions
or those based on inadequate information are unlikely (or less likely

than choices based on greater consideration) to be the rational judgments reflecting long-term interests presumed by the precommitment
model. Even a short waiting period marginally increases the ability of
each partner to acquire information about the prospective spouse and
to weigh long-term interests adequately. Further, passage of time
before marriage may reduce the errors caused by availability and cog-

nitive dissonance. This may improve the soundness of both the marriage and the precommitment decisions.
Another strategy for encouraging better decisions is raising the
minimum age requirement for marriage. Success or failure of marriage is more closely correlated with age at the time of marriage than
with any other variable. 171 Up to a point, the older the parties are at
the time of (first) marriage, the lower the risk of divorce. Precommitment theory suggests that raising the legal age of marriage would

marginally reduce the expected rate of divorce. 172 Greater maturity
170A period of more than a few months would likely be unacceptable to most people.
Today, maximum delay of a few days is typically required. See supra note 12.
171Many studies support the proposition that marriages by persons under the age of 20 are
more likely to end in divorce than those entered by older persons. See, e.g., Bumpass & Sweet,
supra note 81, at 755, 759; Glick & Lin, Recent Changes in Divorce and Remarriage, 48 J.
Marriage & Fam. 737, 738 (1986) (divorce for women married under 20 is 53 per 1000; for
women 25-29, 40 per 1000). Another study found that couples who marry in their teens are
twice as likely to divorce as those who marry in their twenties. Norton & Glick, Marital
Instability in America: Past, Present, and Future, in Divorce & Separation, supra note 99, at 6,
10. See generally, Kitson & Raschlee, Divorce Research: What We Know, What We Need to
Know, J. Divorce, Spring 1981, at 1, 12-13 (citing articles on same relationship of age and
marital stability).
172The minimum age of marriage in most states today is 18; marriage is permitted with
parental permission at age 16 in many states. Council of State Gov'ts, supra note 12, at 46.
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at the time of marriage promotes more thoughtful decisionmaking by
persons whose identity is more fully formed and whose long-term

goals more clearly formulated. Overall, as long as delaying marriage
signifies postponing
children, such a policy offers substantial societal
3
benefits.

17

C. Antenuptial Contractsas Precommitment Mechanisms

Couples entering marriage could execute antenuptial agreements
restricting divorce to reinforce their commitment to each other and to
the marriage. Such agreements should be enforceable under ordinary
contract principles. To be sure, because of the novelty of such con-

tracts, courts might initially subject precommitment contracts to
skepticism and critical scrutiny. Antenuptial agreements today are
typically executed for other purposes, such as protecting the assets of
one or both spouses from the claims of the other upon divorce or
death. 174 Moreover, even these "traditional" antenuptial agreements
are less routinely enforced by courts than commercial contracts or
The law currently varies the age at which minors are allowed to engage in adult activities,
depending on the activity. Thus, minors can drive at age 16, vote at 18, and purchase liquor at
age 21. Society has an interest in promoting mature judgments about decisions to marry, just
as it does about decisions to drink.
173 There are two disadvantages of raising the legal age for marriage: (1) young couples may
migrate to other states; and (2) marriage will be unavailable to pregnant teenagers. The latter
problem seems more serious; unless some flexibility in the age requirement permits marriage
by pregnant teenagers, which itself may create undesirable incentives, their children may
suffer. Although, in general, teenage marriages following pregnancy do little to benefit the
children whose existence led to the marriage, there are likely some cases in which children's
welfare is promoted by their teenage parents' marriage. One point is clear: Policies promoting
education about and access to contraceptives would be important if marriage were delayed.
174 Typically, premarital agreements are executed in two types of cases. In the first
situation, one of the partners is wealthy, and she (or her family) may wish to protect assets
from the claims of the other spouse should the couple divorce in the future. See Osborne v.
Osborne, 384 Mass. 591, 428 N.E.2d 810 (1981) (upholding antenuptial contract between
wealthy heiress and future husband in which each relinquished interest in property of other).
Second, couples who marry later in life may seek to protect the inheritance of children from
previous marriages. See Scherer v. Scherer, 249 Ga. 635, 292 S.E.2d 662 (1982). One study
calculated that 80% of men and 70% of women who executed antenuptial agreements had
been married before and that 90% of men and 94% of women had children in the earlier
marriage. Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. Miami L. Rev. 692, 733 (1972) (basing
findings on antenuptial contracts from 1956 to 1966).
Even more unusual is the use of premarital agreements to restrict divorce. For one example,
see Sanders v. Sanders, 40 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1956) (premarital contract
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even separation agreements executed at the time of divorce. 175 None-

theless, given that the current trend is toward more routine judicial
enforcement, 176 and that the legal environment is generally hospitable
to private ordering, the claim for enforcement of many precommit-

ment agreements is strong. 17 7 Of course, extreme restrictions, such as
contracts never to divorce, would be unenforceable because they
implicate the prohibition against voluntary enslavement. 178 However,
providing that party seeking divorce forfeits all interest in all joint property). Some courts
have upheld restrictions on remarriage. See infra note 179.
Theodore Haas has recently argued that the law should recognize contracts restricting
divorce such as the one in Sanders. He argues that such contracts pass constitutional muster
and should be enforceable under modem contract law. Although derived from a different
theoretical foundation, much of Haas's thesis is consistent with this Article. Haas, The
Rationality and Enforceability of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 879,
882 (1988).
175 During the regime of fault divorce, antenuptial contracts were rejected by courts because
they were thought to encourage divorce. Enforcement today is much more common, but
prenuptial agreements continue to receive greater scrutiny than other contracts. The
enforcement decision typically focuses on an assessment of the fairness of the prenuptial
agreement when executed and at the time of enforcement. Prenuptial agreements that impose
"undue hardship" on one spouse may be unenforceable. Couples entering into prenuptial
agreements may not predict the circumstances that may result in hardship or unfairness when
the agreement is enforced. An agreement may stipulate little or no spousal support, based on
the presumption that both spouses will work during the marriage. If one stays at home to care
for children, and falls to acquire job-related skills and experience, this provision may impose a
hardship. Unfairness may also result when assets increase beyond premarital expectation. See
Gross v. Gross, 11 Ohio St. 3d 99, 464 N.E.2d 500 (1984) (striking down premarital agreement
allotting wife $200 a month alimony where husband's assets increased from $500,000 to $6
million during marriage).
176The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, which has been adopted by several states,
reflects this trend; it treats antenuptial agreements, in most regards, like commercial contracts.
Unif. Premarital Agreement Act, 9B U.L.A. 371 (1987). Under the Uniform Act, agreements
are enforceable if voluntary, informed, and not unconscionable when executed, even if
unforeseen circumstances thereafter result in disadvantage to one spouse. The Uniform
Premarital Agreement Act, drafted in 1983, has been adopted by California, Virginia, Texas,
and several other states. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 5300-5317 (West Supp. 1989); Va. Code
Ann. § 20-147 to 20-155 (Supp. 1989).
177Indeed, courts may be more favorable to some precommitment agreements than to
traditional premarital agreements. Courts often refuse to enforce prenuptial agreements
because they encourage divorce. See Neilson v. Neilson, 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)
(refusing to enforce provision of premarital agreement that unreasonably promotes divorce).
178 Anthony Kronman argues that contracts not to divorce are of a type that are
appropriately subject to paternalistic restriction by the state. The effect of such a contract is to
limit the choice usually available under a binding executory contract either to perform or pay
damages. In Kronman's view, by removing the alternative of paying damages, a contract not
to divorce is a form of self-enslavement. This restriction represents a threat to personal
integrity or self-respect because it removes the right to depersonalize the marriage relationship

1990]

RationalDecisionmaking

restrictions on divorce that simply make that option more costly,
including delays that temporarily restrict freedom to remarry, do not
prohibitively interfere with personal freedom.179 Indeed, the effect (if
not the purpose) of many currently enforceable antenuptial agree180
ments is to make the decision to divorce more costly.

If the current trend toward enforcement of antenuptial agreements

under general contract principles continues, no great impediment
blocks the enforcement of precommitment contracts, and absent some

strong paternalistic justification, none should. A libertarian policy
would argue for permitting couples to pursue their goals of lasting
marriage even though some risks are involved. This does not, however, resolve the normative question whether precommitment agreements should be encouraged or facilitated. Such judgments require
examination of the formation and enforcement of this peculiar type of

contract, and of the factors that may distinguish these agreements
from the general run of commercial contracts.
1.

UnrestrainedPrivate Ordering

Freedom to design precommitment agreements is most fully protected if parties can negotiate individualized terms.181 In addition to
the precommitment terms describing economic penalties, waiting
by paying damages instead of performing under the contract. This is particularly costly if the
promisor's values have changed greatly from the time that the contract was executed.
Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 Yale L.J. 763, 774-82 (1983).
In essence, Kronman is raising the "later selves" problem described in Part II, see notes 13238 and accompanying text; one implication of his analysis is that if paying damages may be
substituted for performance (as would often be true under precommitment terms), the selfenslavement problem is greatly reduced. Further, mandatory delay represents significantly
less of a restraint on personal freedom than a promise not to divorce.
179 Indeed, even under traditional law some courts have upheld contractual restraints on
remarriage. See S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 1741, at 67 (W. Jaeger 3d
ed. 1972); see also Cowan v. Cowan, 247 Iowa 729, 75 N.W.2d 920 (1956) (contract
restraining remarriage until children are adults with forfeiture of $10,000 upheld); Saslow v.
Saslow, 104 Ohio App. 157, 147 N.E.2d 262 (1957) (three-year restraint on second marriage
after divorce upheld).
180 Consider, for example, a spouse who forfeits a life of luxury with the wealthy partner by
leaving the marriage.
181 The following terms might be included in a "typical" precommitment contract, formally
executed and recorded at the time of marriage: If either party should in the future want to
leave the marriage he or she would forfeit $200,000. If the couple has minor children, marital
property is to be held in trust for the support of the children. Final divorce will follow two
years after notice is tendered, three years if the couple has minor children. The parties agree
that should either party be seriously dissatisfied with the marriage, they will participate in six
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periods, and other conditions, the parties can designate modification
provisions1 82 and contingencies under which all or part of the agreement will not be enforced against a party seeking divorce.1 83 Precommitment theory suggests that, thereafter, either spouse will be
dissuaded from seeking exit from the marriage by a calculation of the
additional costs that were assumed by the contract. Further, if he
does announce an intention to leave the marriage, reconsideration
during a waiting period may lead to reconciliation.
Several problems with a pure contractarian precommitment regime
are evident. A premarital precommitment agreement is a long-term
relational contract executed in a setting that may exaggerate the difficulties of formulating contract terms.1 84 Uniquely problematic is the
possible effect of cognitive biases that may distort decisionmaking in
the premarital context. Enthusiastic optimism about the success of
the marriage may lead parties to impose onerous costs on a divorce
decision that is perceived as remote and improbable. 85 Moreover, a
difficulty intrinsic to all relational contracts, that of providing mechanisms for later adjustment, is especially troublesome here. 186 The
parties may be less likely than commercial contractors to foresee conmonths of marriage counseling. Finally, divorce is conditioned on a psychological evaluation
of minor children and provision for necessary therapeutic interventions.
182 For example, the contract could designate modification of economic terms if income
departs from predicted levels, or one party's employment status changes.
183 For example, one party may find infidelity intolerable and stipulate that sexual
involvement by the spouse with a third party will be cause for excuse from the precommitment
penalties. The other party, reared by alcoholic parents, may insist that a pattern of frequent
intoxication be designated as an excuse from performance of the contract.
184 A relational contract is one in which important terms cannot be defined explicitly
because all contingencies cannot be anticipated. For an analysis of relational contracts and the
difficulties of applying classical contract doctrine to these agreements, see Goetz & Scott,
Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 (1981). Examples of commercial
relational contracts include franchises, joint ventures, and employment contracts. Id. at 1091.
A premarital agreement is also subject to hazards that are commonly recognized limitations on
contract formation when negotiations are not at arm's length. Each party may not consider
his or her own interests, and duress or information deficits may result in an agreement unfair
to one party.
185 For example, if entering precommitments before marriage became common practice, a
couple might view the agreement as a symbolic expression of their determination to have a
lasting marriage.
186 Providing mechanisms for adjustment is one of the challenges of relational contract. See
Scott, supra note 113 (examining adjustment in the relational contract context using game
theory rather than bargain theory). Gillette argues against a duty to adjust when an
intervening event greatly changes the benefit of the contract for one party. Commercial
contractors, Gillette argues, are rational planners capable of taking into account the
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tingencies that would support modification or excuse. Partly because
of contextual cognitive biases, couples may discount or fail to antici1 87
pate the need to include provisions for excuse from performance.

For example, the couple negotiating a prenuptial agreement may simply not contemplate the effect of spousal abuse on the victim's obligation under the contract, because such an eventuality seems remote
and dissonant.18 8 Moreover, the couple simply cannot and will not
anticipate every event in the course of a marriage that may alter the
impact of the burden on one or both parties 1 9 and that if considered

ex ante would have affected the terms of the contract. For example, a
precommitment agreement executed before marriage when both parties contemplate careers later may impose a differential burden if one
party has chosen to be a homemaker in the interval.1 90

Thus,

although there might be consensus that some contingencies should
alter the obligation or even excuse one spouse from the marriage and

precommitment contract without sanction, the couple might not adequately address such matters in the contract. Further, the problems
are compounded by the difficulty in modifying long-term contractual
agreements once they are executed. 191 Thus, in the future the
unhappy spouse may be forced to choose between remaining in an
intolerable marriage or opting for a costly divorce.
A couple, recognizing that they cannot anticipate all contingencies
and that the designation of specific contingencies may promote opporuncertainty of the future in bargaining. Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to
Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 521, 523-24 (1985).
187 See generally supra notes 139-51 and accompanying text.
188 Other unanticipated contingencies might include adultery, mental illness, or alcoholism.
189 It should be clear that this is different from the "later selves" problem. See supra notes
132-38 and accompanying text. Life will offer unanticipated contingencies without a change in
personal identity.
190 Other examples of changes in economic fortune that may affect the precommitment
burden are a large inheritance, a disability or long illness, or an extraordinarily successful or
disappointing career. Both parties may be burdened by the unanticipated turn of events. For
example, if the couple's income is considerably less than they anticipated before marriage, both
may be imprisoned in the marriage and unable to bear the cost of the penalty. In this case, the
party who wants to continue the marriage is in a good strategic bargaining position.
191 See supra notes 184 and 186. Modification may be particularly difficult in the marital
setting because of the absence of arm's-length negotiations. Discussion about modification
may be difficult; it may create dissonance (or at least discomfort) if the couple is happily
married, or resistance, because a party raising the issue may signal unhappiness with the
marriage.
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tunistic behavior, 192 might use a broader standard describing, in general, the nature of the circumstances that would support modification
or excuse. 193 For example, the parties might agree that excuse from
performance and release from contractual penalties would occur if the

behavior of the spouse should destroy the value of the marriage for

the individual seeking divorce.194 A broad standard raises formidable
enforcement difficulties, however. In a world with perfect information and an omniscient decisionmaker, such an excuse provision
clearly reflects the objectives of the precommitment contract. In the
real world, however, applying an excusing condition stated as a broad

standard will generate error. Because the goal of the contract is to
discourage impulsive expression of short-term preferences, evidence
that the condition has been met cannot be satisfied simply by the
assertion of the party seeking release from the marriage and the contract that the other spouse has destroyed the value of the marriage.
Decisionmaking biases, as well as the possibility that the decision rep-

resents temporarily dominant short-term preferences, suggest that
this is unreliable evidence that the excusing condition has been met.
The problem of modification and excuse may loom larger in theory
than in practice. Background legal rules defining conditions of modifications and excuse in precommitment agreements will go far to miti192Opportunistic behavior occurs when a party acts contrary to the other party's
understanding, though not contrary to any explicit contract term. Muris, Opportunistic
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 521 (1981). A party may
opportunistically seek release from the contract or a bargaining advantage on the occurrence
of a contingency that does not in fact have the effect of making the marriage intolerable.
Precommitment theory also suggests that some contingencies and events may seem in the short
run to destroy the value of the marriage. Release from the marriage and commitment in these
cases may be a response to fluctuating short-term preferences and may undermine the purpose
of the precommitment agreements. Alternatively, a spouse may adhere to the letter of the
agreement, but undermine the marriage commitment and objectives in subtle ways that do not
fall within specific categories of excuse.
193Long term contracts have traditionally used general terms to describe obligations. An
example is the use of "best efforts" standards of performance. Goetz & Scott, supra note 184,
at 1092-95. One interpretation of the "best effort" obligation is that it creates an obligation to
produce an outcome that best maximizes the joint gains of the contracting parties. Id. at 111418.
194Theoretically (that is, consistently with precommitment theory), an excusing condition
might be any event, condition, or conduct that destroyed the value of the marriage for one
party. However, broad excuse provisions threaten to undermine the operation of the model to
the extent that they allow easy release from the commitment. The key is to provide a
mechanism for determining that a contingency in fact destroys the value of the marriage. See
infra notes 207-10 and accompanying text.
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gate the costs created by unanticipated contingencies. Lawmakers
will be better situated than couples contemplating marriage to predict
and define the conditions that would make marriage intolerable for
most people or that argue compellingly for modification of the contract. The couple, of course, may contract out of the conditions
defined by the rules. Otherwise, the framework of legal rules will
reflect the judgment about the provisions that most couples entering
precommitment agreements would include in their contracts had they
anticipated the contingencies. Moreover, legally required mandatory
delay (absent contrary contractual provisions) will promote the
enforcement of only those excuse conditions that destroy the value of
the marriage.
2.

Standard-FormContracts

Standard-form precommitment contracts offer another means to
mitigate some of the problems with freely negotiated premarital
agreements. Although standard-form contracts restrict the parties'
ability to tailor the terms of the agreement to their own particular
relationship, their advantages are particularly compelling, given the
rather daunting problems of contract formation and enforcement.
Standard-form contracts offer couples seeking to execute a precommitment agreement the benefit of accumulated information about
precommitment terms and contingencies. Precommitment terms in
standard forms can be tested over time against a variety of different
variables such as income level and the presence of minor children. 195
Further, changes that occur in many marriages but that may not be
anticipated by the parties may be accommodated by terms defining
contingencies for modification and excuse. 196 Release from the contractual obligation could be based on experiential judgment about
behavior or conditions that would make the release appropriate for
most people.
195

A bar association or American Law Institute committee might assume the task of

formulating terms of standard-form contracts. Such a group is well situated to oversee the

evolution of model standard-form provisions, proposing, monitoring, and amending terms as
information accumulates over time about the use of precommitment agreements. See Coffee,
infra note 197.
196 Thus, for example, the contract may define modifications based on changes in income,
net worth, job status, etc.
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Standard-form precommitment contracts may also mitigate the
effects of cognitive biases that might lead decisionmakers in the
premarriage context to undertake excessive commitment. Thus, for
example, a standard contract term might prohibit divorce until two
years after one spouse had given the other notice, but would not
require a ten-year delay (as an ardent couple might). Similarly, terms
dealing with monetary support of children, property, and financial
penalties could be adjusted to eliminate idiosyncratic or extreme commitments. In sum, a menu of standard-form terms may reduce many
of the formulation and enforcement problems that would impair a
system of unrestrained private ordering.
The extent to which the use of standard-form terms restricts private
ordering will depend on how much the state wants to promote the use
of precommitment agreements and to influence the nature of the
precommitment burden that couples assume. Couples could be
invited to precommit at their option, either negotiating their own deal
or choosing from a menu of standard terms. Alternatively, adoption
of a precommitment contract could be encouraged through incentive
schemes or by legally requiring a couple to choose from a menu of
standard-form terms. Given our libertarian tradition, a legal requirement to execute a precommitment agreement would be troublesome if
only the interests of the parties were at stake. On the other hand, the
case is strong for restricting the freedom of parties to negotiate individualized terms if the interests of third parties, such as minor children, are at stake. 197

197Currently, because of the state's interest in protecting the welfare of children, courts are
not bound by premarital contracts dealing with custody or child support. Contractual
provisions freeing one party from child support obligations are unenforceable. Under a more
restrictive policy, all couples could be directed to choose from among several standard term
packages dealing exclusively with the contingency of divorce occurring during the minority of

the couples' children. Each package would provide substantial support and protection to
children. At their option, couples could include other provisions. For an interesting corporate
law analog, see Coffee, No Exit?: Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and
the Special Case of Remedies, 53 Brooklyn L. Rev. 919 (1988). Coffee has examined
contractual modification of corporate charters to limit liability of officers and directors and to

restrict shareholder access to derivative suits. He argues for restrictions on private ordering in
this context because of high information costs and the possibility of opportunistic
manipulation by management. Coffee's solution is to regulate "contracting out" from
generally applicable rules, by requiring that modification be limited to a menu of "model"
standard form contractual provisions drafted by the ABA or ALI. Id. at 970-74.

RationalDecisionmaking

1990]
D.

Precommitment Through Mandatory Rules

The interests of adults in pursuing their personal goals for lasting
marriage may be advanced if they are permitted to execute legally
enforceable precommitment contracts. Precommitment theory also
supports a scheme of mandatory legal rules making the divorce process more cumbersome. Legislative restrictions would constructively
express the aspirations of individuals for their marriages and provide
a mechanism to assist people to realize their goals. To be sure, no
societal consensus today supports serious legal restrictions on
divorces not involving children. Any proposal generally limiting
divorce would be resisted as an unwarranted interference with personal freedom. This response loses strength if legal regulation
grounded in precommitment theory is more narrowly directed toward
encouraging parents of minor children to view marriage as a lasting
relationship, to be set aside only as a last resort. This is so because
restrictions directed at this goal express and reinforce widely shared
societal values.
A mandatory precommitment scheme potentially avoids many of
the costs of a pure contractarian regime. Legislatively announced
precommitments presumably reflect a socially defined consensus
about appropriate barriers to divorce under different circumstances.
They also reflect accumulated wisdom about contingencies warranting modification and excuse. 198 Legislatures can avoid the romantic
distortion of persons actually entering marriage; the rules would
likely reflect greater realism about human limitations in following life
plans. Finally, legislative precommitments express societal aspirations for marriage and family through mechanisms that may influence
behavior and attitudes more effectively than a permissive policy. A
precommitment rationale supports mandatory rules creating premarital and predivorce waiting periods, rigorous support obligations and
enforcement, 199 required mediation or counseling, and family property trusts.
198These rules could be devised from the perspective of a Rawlsian "original position,"
defining the hypothesized commitment that individuals would make to protect their life plans
and promote their children's welfare under different contingencies without knowing what their
own future held. See J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971).
199In theory most precommitment terms discussed above in Part IIIB could be legislatively
mandated. For example, mandatory delay before divorce could be enacted as a provision that
two years separation is the only available divorce ground.
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The principal argument against mandatory commitment is a formidable one: If precommitment policy is implemented through
mandatory rules, does not the precommitment rationale become
merely a fiction cloaking an intrusive paternalistic policy? The state,
having decided what is best for families, justifies the legal rules on the
grounds that individuals would have desired these restrictions if only
they had thought about them in a rational manner and had not suffered from weak will. 20° It is not hard to imagine extreme policies
that could be justified using this rationale. Furthermore, precommitment theory presumes a voluntary decision to bind oneself, a premise
that is undermined if mandatory rules are imposed.0 1
Mandatory commitments may be defended against the attack of
paternalism. If the restrictions imposed by law reflect the ex ante
preferences of individuals who are thereby bound, then they are not
paternalistic.20 2 I have argued that this may indeed be the case in the
marital context. Thus, a measure of the acceptability of any
mandatory restriction on divorce (and a check on legislated precommitments) is that the rule plausibly reflects the preferences of rational
couples seeking to reinforce their commitment to lasting marriage.
The fact that people get married voluntarily also supports mandatory
precommitments. In the current social environment, the alternative
of cohabitation is available and offers many of the benefits of marriage.20 3 A regime of mandatory commitments simply announces to
the couple considering marriage that it is a relationship governed by a
legal norm that supports the continuation of the marriage as long as
there are minor children. The choice to get married represents
200 Linked to this concern about paternalism is the fear that mandatory commitments will
gradually lead to regressive social policies based on political conservatism and religious

fundamentalism, all justified by a precommitment rationale. Limiting legal enforcement of
precommitment strategies to those chosen by the individuals themselves offers a safeguard that
protects individual and family autonomy and privacy and is only indirectly subject to political
pressures.
201 State-imposed restrictions on marital freedom may raise constitutional challenges that
would not apply to voluntarily assumed contractual restrictions. Statutes imposing excessive
restrictions on marriage may be struck down as interfering with liberty and privacy.
202 See J. Elster, supra note 87, at 88-94 (analyzing the exercise of governmental power in
democracies (for example, use of a constitution or a central bank) as precommitments).
203 See Jaff, supra note 119, at 226-27. Jaff argues that unmarried couples suffer from legal
or social discrimination. Her primary focus, however, is discrimination against homosexual

and minority relationships. The legal disadvantages met by unmarried heterosexual couples
are minimal by comparison.
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acceptance of that norm, which is implemented through the divorce
law. A regime that encourages long and careful consideration about
the decision to divorce by parents of minor children would reflect
broadly shared societal values. If this is so, the choice for most future
parents considering marriage is not oppressive or coercive. Rather,
the legal restrictions reinforce and support the goals that many people
have for themselves, serving in fact as precommitments rather than as
burdensome restraints.
A potential cost of uncertain dimensions arises if a couple is
deterred from marriage (because they do not wish to make the commitment) and then later have children. If my intuition is correct and
many people entering marriage have an incentive to make a commitment, this problem may not be significant. 2" Also, the costs can be
mitigated by provisions for the economic support of children in single
parent homes. Nevertheless, legitimate concerns that legal rules may
create incentives not to marry should moderate the choice of precommitment rules.
A more basic theoretical challenge occurs. Restrictions on divorce
will be burdensome and paternalistic for those individuals for whom
personal liberty is more important than the relationship values I have
described. Although the choice of cohabitation may be available,
freedom to enter a marriage of limited commitment may be constrained. 20z Thus, a mandatory regime that restricted all divorce for
the announced purpose of assisting people to achieve their personal
goals would be vulnerable to challenge by those whose goals depart
from the norm.
The argument favoring mandatory precommitments is far stronger
if only divorces involving minor children are regulated. First, the
assertion that such restrictions reflect the ex ante preferences of most
people is convincing in this context. Moreover, the precommitment
rationale is supplemented by another objective that enjoys broad societal support, that of protecting the welfare of children. Thus, if
restrictions are limited to divorces involving children, objections by
those adults whose personal goals are impeded by this redefinition of
marriage and family lose force. A precommitment-based legal regime
204 Anecdotal evidence suggests that many couples living together decide to marry when
they plan to have children.
205 Some people may find the status of being married desirable for social, moral, or religious
reasons.
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that burdens divorce by parents of minor children expresses the values and personal goals of many people. The expression itself
announces the importance of these values and thereby may subtly
influence attitudes and behavior, reinforcing as the dominant norm a
conception of marriage and family that emphasizes commitment and
relationship.
E. The Casefor Two Legal Regimes
My analysis suggests that precommitment could influence the law
of divorce in two ways. The first involves only modest doctrinal
reform that would clarify the enforceability of antenuptial precommitment agreements under general contract law principles. The second
use is considerably bolder. Precommitment theory would serve as the
basis of a reconceptualization of the legal regulation of divorces
involving children.
Antenuptial precommitment agreements should be uncontroversial
in a libertarian legal regime. Some couples may wish to bind themselves contractually to promote marital stability through difficult
times, whether or not they will have children in the future. They may
conclude that the potential benefits of precommitment more than justify the risk that costs may be incurred should the marriage fall. Further, as in other contractual relationships, one party may act in
reliance on the commitment to her detriment if the other party
breaches the contract. The hazards that are predictably associated
with such contracts may be largely mitigated either by the use of standard-form contracts or by background legal rules defining conditions
of modification and excuse. Moreover, limits on the enforcement of
extremely restrictive provisions may be justified on paternalistic
grounds. In general, however, no compelling reason argues against
allowing couples to assess the risks and benefits of attempting to further their personal objectives through precommitment.
The application of precommitment theory to divorces involving
children is more far reaching in scope. At a minimum, the legal rules
will distinguish parents from other divorcing spouses. The more
ambitious objective is that by signaling that divorce in this context is a
very serious matter, the law not only will influence the decisions of
parents contemplating leaving a marriage, but will affect more generally social norms defining the meaning of family relationships.
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How might the law treat families with minor children differently
from others? First, and most importantly, parents of minor children
could be subject to substantial mandatory delay periods to promote
more thoughtful divorce decisions and to make divorce less attractive.
Thus, a two-year separation could be the only ground for divorce for
this group. Parents could be bound to more substantial support obligations than currently and to property distribution schemes that are
beneficial to children. Counseling, mediation, and mental health evaluation of the children might be required before divorce is permitted.
To be sure, a policy promoting commitment will also make divorce
less attractive or available to some parents whose long-term interests
may be reflected in the choice to end the marriage. Nevertheless, even
if parents reveal themselves to be "nonconforming" cases, social science research on divorce at least indirectly supports the view that
many of their children may benefit if their parents' marriage continues. 20 6 In sum, precommitment theory goes a long way toward justifying a policy of promoting marital stability in families with minor
children. To the extent that such a policy cannot be entirely justified
by precommitment theory alone, other well-established policy objectives offer further support.
Many individuals who enter marriage are probably highly motivated to fulfill their responsibilities to future children. I have argued
that although the norm of moral or religious responsibility that supported traditional marriage has eroded, the sense of moral responsibility to one's own children continues to be important to most persons.
Therefore, many would be willing to accept a greater risk of error in
the application of precommitment theory in pursuit of the objective of
protecting the welfare of their children.
F

A PotentialSolution to the Problem of Fault

Whether precommitments are adopted contractually or imposed by
mandatory rule, there remains a vexing problem of defining the circumstances that justify excuse from performance. Any justifiable
scheme must provide for an effective response to seriously offensive
behavior by one spouse without encouraging avoidance of precommit206 This is surely true if continued marriage need not signify continued cohabitation, and
parents who are engaged in substantial conflict are separated.
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ment obligations by any unhappy marital partner.2 "7 For example, a
legal scheme is untenable if it requires an abused spouse to choose
between continuing in the marriage or bearing the costs imposed by
precommitment. On the other hand, allowing fault grounds as an
excuse from precommitment may seriously undermine the regime. A
dissatisfied party may opportunistically or impulsively assert a fault
ground to obtain release from the marriage and the precommitment.
Other problems that emerged under the traditional divorce law are
also predictable. Couples may collude to establish a ground because
both are temporarily dissatisfied or because one is dissatisfied, and the
other wants to extract a monetary advantage. The challenge is to discourage opportunistic, impulsive, or collusive use of fault while at the
same time offering protection and ultimately excuse to the "innocent"
spouse.
Legal regulation may go a long way toward this goal if separation is
available to the aggrieved spouse, but divorce and excuse from the
precommitment obligation follow only after an extensive mandatory
waiting period. If fault by one spouse is not the means to ready
release from marital obligations by the other, it is less likely to be used
opportunistically or collusively. Offensive spousal behavior may
severely but temporarily damage the marriage, or it may destroy the
relationship altogether. Mandatory delay before divorce may reduce
the number of hurt or angry decisions to leave the marriage in situations in which time and reflection would lead to a different

207 Although this problem may exist with contractual precommitments, it may be more
acute under statutory schemes. Legislatures may be less likely to overlook circumstances that,
in general, will justify excuse from performance of the precommitment obligation; in any
specific marriage, however, a mandatory rule may be less accurate than a private contract in
designating contingencies that would make marriage intolerable for either party. Behavior by
one spouse that may destroy the value of the marriage for the other might include infidelity,
abandonment, physical abuse, criminal conviction, or even mental illness or alcoholism.
However, different persons vary in their response to different contingencies; behavior that
would destroy the marriage for one individual may have a less devastating impact for someone
else. Thus, defining excuse from precommitment under generally applicable rules is difficult.
That many of the examples of offensive spousal behavior correspond to traditional fault
grounds for divorce is not surprising. See Ga. Code Ann. § 19-5-3 (1982). Criticism of

traditional divorce law was not based on the irrationality of announcing that certain conduct
could be destructive of the value of the marriage. Rather, fault grounds were deemed
inadequate as the sole basis for divorce because they were simplistic in defining causes of
marital breakdown, and tended to promote collusion and opportunistic behavior. See supra
notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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decision.208
For those cases in which the offensive behavior destroys the value
of the relationship, a two-stage process can substantially protect the
injured spouse. First, she may be permitted to effect a legal separation
and to compel financial support and protection of assets during the
waiting period. 20 9 At the end of the waiting period, a finding of substantial offensive behavior by one spouse would excuse the aggrieved
party from the marriage and from the obligations imposed by
precommitment. 1 °
This response to fault behavior substantially protects the injured
party while remaining wholly consistent with precommitment theory.
A decision to divorce after a period of mandatory delay more likely
reflects changed long-term preferences of the aggrieved spouse than
would be the case if fault grounds provided the means to accelerated
divorce. Time may reduce impulsive decisionmaking and may also
reduce contextual decisionmaking biases (which are likely to be substantial in these situations). In general, the case for mandatory delay
to promote thoughtful divorce decisions is probably as strong in situations in which the desire to leave the marriage is prompted by offensive behavior of the spouse as it is when boredom or other attractions
are the motivating factors. There are two differences, however. First,
the need for legal and financial protection of the injured spouse during
the separation period may be particularly compelling in the case of
fault-induced separation; second, ultimately the injured spouse may
be excused from any other precommitment obligations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The costs of marital failure are substantial. Adults may experience
the disappointment of their personal aspirations, and children suffer
208 In terms of precommitment theory, the angry response may in some cases express a
short-term preference to leave the marriage.
209 Many state laws today include provisions for legal separation. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann.
§ 20-91(9)(a) (1983). Alternatively, provisions for separate maintenance (under which
financial support is ordered but no legal separation takes place) could be adapted to respond to
this situation. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 34-23 to 34-24 (West 1987). Financial protection may
include protection of the financial assets of the marriage.
210 Indeed, it will be appropriate in many cases for precommitment penalties to fall on the
"guilty" spouse for the destruction of the marriage. Certainly in cases of abandonment, any
other response would provide an escape, allowing a dissatisfied spouse to leave the marriage
without experiencing the precommitment costs.
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psychological and economic harm. I have argued that the law could
reduce these costs by assisting individuals to conform to their intentions for lasting marriage. A regime of enforceable precommitment to
marriage will discourage precipitous decisions to divorce by making
that choice more costly. It also will indirectly tend to promote marital stability and to encourage more careful decisionmaking about both
marriage and divorce.
Precommitments will not always function optimally, however.
They may impose unnecessary costs on persons for whom unimpeded
divorce would best promote their goals of self-fulfillment. Therefore,
although precommitment agreements should be enforced under general contract principles, a regime of mandatory legal rules promoting
commitment to marriage is justified only to protect the interests of
minor children. That is to say, the legal regulation of divorce involving children should promote long and careful consideration of the
decision and assure, to the extent possible, that their interests are recognized. By announcing to future parents that marriage with children is a relationship not easily set aside, the law may promote a
modem ideology of marriage that reflects more accurately than the
current legal norm the goals of many people for themselves and their
children.

